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COMBAT PROVEN BUSINESS

Exporting the 'Israel Brand' to Maintain the Occupation and Normalise Injustice

Authors: Alejandro Pozo Marín, Ainhoa Ruiz Benedicto

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Exporting arms to Israel contravenes the spirit and letter of the law designed to reduce suffering and instability in many countries. This is clearly the case in EU member states. Moreover, it only seems possible to justify such transfers is by prioritizing commerce over morals, or by ignorance of the situation in Palestine. However, exports to Israel are normalised, even encouraged, in the vast majority of weapons producing countries. Yet Israel has one of the world's most important military industries, and in fact has a greater needs to sell than to buy arms. Exporting large volumes allows it to increase production, which decreases the costs of what it needs to maintain the military occupation and its military relevance as a Middle Eastern power. In order to achieve such volumes, it needs a brand that provides a global competitive advantage. And it needs to build that brand based on two sources of added values. The first involves being at the cutting edge of (especially military) technology, by investing heavily in and promoting national research and production. It also positions and promotes its exports in this sense, using national machinery to serve its military industry. The second involves advertising its products as "Combat Proven". For years, Palestine, and especially the Gaza Strip, have been a laboratory for testing Israeli military material. This situation is defended by the Israeli authorities, and vaunted by the companies selling such products all over the world.

This report seeks to explore the various ways in which the Israeli government and industry (in constant synergy and complicity) do business in order to maintain their increasingly costly *security* model in Israel, the Occupied Palestinian Territories and their respective borders. And to examine the ways in which Israel expands its global brand, allowing it to maintain this situation through revenue, power and complicit allies.

This report has three sections. The first two examine the arms trade and industrial cooperation by studying the case of Spain. This provides de-

tails on arms relations between Spain and Israel, and also shows how these businesses work. While this does not cover all the methods used by Israel (which is one of the world's biggest exporters of arms and military services), it does provide a fairly representative overview from which conclusions can be drawn. Section three provides a global approach to one of the most important aspects of Israel's *security* business: border control. Israel is the paradigm of a walled state: it has six walls and a total of six borders. No other country comes close in terms of the symbolism of its use of concrete and barbed wire. Israel has also tried to export this model of control for commercial gain, and its success has clearly been so great that it has achieved the obscene normalisation and exploitation of an experience that has caused so much suffering and injustice.

Some of the main messages and conclusions of this report are as follows:

■ The seriousness of defence material exports by EU states (938,364,821 euros in authorisations in 2020) to Israel is not so much due to quantity - since Israel does not need European arms with its level of production-, it is more so because, on the one hand, it is a violation of Spanish and European legislation and, on the other, it basically serves to establish other types of commercial and industrial relations, and opens doors for Israeli industry to enter into European production and aid to this type of company.

■ Spanish and European arms exports to Israel violate the eight Criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP, which defines common rules governing the control of exports of military technology and equipment.

■ Despite the violations of the Common Position's criteria by Israel and its behaviour and situation, there is no official record of any denial of authorisation for the export of Spanish Defence material prior to 2015. Since then, denials have been few, five licences: in 2015, 2017 and 2019.

■ In Spain, as in other countries, cutting-edge products and technology are presented as combat-proven. Examples include Rafael's Spike missiles, drones from IAI and Elbit Systems, ground vehicle turrets from Rafael, mortar systems from Elbit Systems or tank ammunition from Israel Military Industries Ltd (IMI Systems). These manufacturers are among the firms most profiting from the military occupations and tensions in the region, and all of these products have been advertised as "combat proven" in Gaza.

■ Israel has one of the world's most advanced and global defence industries, so it exports more than it imports, its main suppliers being France, Germany and, primarily, the US.

■ Israel's exports, and thus the purchase of Israeli equipment by other countries, becomes even more serious than arms exports to Tel Aviv. The purchase of military equipment from Israel strengthens the country's military and security model and, more importantly, contributes to maintaining the occupation, which Israel makes economically viable by selling its "combat proven" military products.

■ This viability is achieved by lowering domestic costs by manufacturing in excess and exporting the surplus (three quarters of its production). As a hypothetical example, if it costs ten million euros to produce one tank, it might cost 50 million euros to produce ten, halving the cost per unit if Israel manages to export the nine surplus.

■ Spain uses espionage and communications interception services provided by Israeli companies. Clients include the Ministry of Defence, the CNI, the National Police Corps, the Guardia Civil and various regional police forces. Among the products offered, the NSO Group Technologies' Pegasus programme and Verint Systems' services and applications stand out.

■ Israel is the paradigm of a walled state in the world, along with Morocco; all of its borders contain walls and fences in some section, and these walls are used to consolidate territorial occupation and expulsion. This has also led to the growth of a varied and lucrative market for Israeli industry, linked to the construction of walls and fences and other border control and surveillance systems.

■ The system of control and surveillance of the daily life of the Palestinian community through walls, fences and movement control systems entails a securitisation of an entire population, which is considered and labelled as "at risk" as a whole. This discourse serves to justify the construction of walls and the deployment of all kinds of technological tools that disrupt the daily life of the Palestinian community in a system of apartheid.

■ Out of 500 companies involved in the production of technologies for Israel's Homeland Security, 173 of them - 35% - are engaged in developing technologies, systems and services that serve to reinforce border fences and walls, as well as other border control and surveillance systems.

■ The global border security market is on the rise, estimated to be worth more than $65 billion by 2025. Among the world's top nine companies in border management is one Israeli company: Elbit Systems Ltd.

■ Israeli industry has been involved in the construction of border walls and surveillance and control technologies in: United States, Kenya, Morocco, South Korea, Cyprus, Colombia, India Greece, South Korea, European Union (Frontex).

■ The "combat proven" or "field-tested" brand that Israel promotes, of products tested in and on the Palestinian population and the occupied Palestinian territories, has become an added value in the international security and defence market. The very existence of this brand is the main reason for condemning the collaboration, production, purchase and use of this equipment.

1. INTRODUCTION: TRADING INJUSTICE

This report examines the *Made in Israel* brand, the marketing of combat proven products, which perpetuates both the economic sustainability of the occupation in Palestine and the expansion of the Israeli security model based on walls, fences, and surveillance technologies. This research follows on from the work of two reports from 2009 and 2014. The first (Pozo Marín, 2009) primarily examined Spanish exports of defence material to Israel and their significance, relevance, and lawfulness. The second (Pozo, Simarro, and Sabaté, 2014) examined other kinds of trade and co-operation relationships in the defence and security sectors, acknowledging the difficulty of carrying out an exhaustive study into sectors shaped by their dynamism, lack of transparency, and secretive nature. This report was launched in 2022, and covers another important factor contributing to the globalisation of the Israeli brand of "combat proven" products, through the expansion of a *security* model that violates human rights and puts business before safety, harmony, and justice.

The 2009 report on Spanish arms exports to Israel started from the hypothesis that this scandal needed to be documented. It showed that these exports were contrary to Spanish and European legislation, while also unethical practice. And it also concluded that exports of Spanish arms to Israel were not the only kind of questionable, or even the most important security and defence sector relationship. In fact, in terms of their economic volume, Spanish arms exports are one of the least significant elements of Spain/Israel relations, and this is also the case in many other countries.

The 2014 report went beyond exports to provide an in-depth exploration of core Spain/Israel military, security, and arms relations. It found ten different types of relationship: 1) bilateral and supranational political complicity and co-operation, both directly between the countries and through international structures such as the EU and NATO; 2) official security and defence agreements between Spain or its regions and the state of Israel; 3) exports of Spanish defence material, dual-use mate-

rials,[1] and 'arms, munitions, and accessories'[2] to Israel; 4) imports of Israeli defence material to Spain; 5) contracts for Israeli defence firms in Spain, often through a consortium with Spanish industry; 6) the establishment of the Israeli defence industry in Spain and the use of Spain as a global base; 7) Israeli security products marketed in Spain; 8) *Made in Israel* security services in Spain; 9) training and the transfer of Israeli Security and Defence know-how; and 10) Research & Development (R&D) relations between the two countries.

This new report by the Centre of Studies for Peace J.M. Delàs (Centre d'Estudis per la Pau J.M. Delàs) seeks to update the statistics and analyses related to the "combat proven" brand that leads governments and industry players all over the world to see many aspects of Israeli *Homeland Security*[3] products and industry as having added value. The conclusions of the 2009 and 2014 reports, which were analysed in detail, have been used to carry out this research. They cover the arms trade (exports and imports) and relations between the military industries in Spain and Israel. This analysis is important to understanding other aspects of how Israel evolves its "combat proven" brand, which include military co-operation and training agreements. This report focuses on the example

of Spain, although some of this analysis can be extrapolated, *mutatis mutandis*, to many other countries. Sections second and third discuss Spain and Israel's commercial arms relationships. Official records are the main source of Spanish or European export data: the Spanish Department of Trade provides statistics under Spain's law on arms exports, in line with the European Council Common Position. These official statistics are not available for imports, so here the report mainly relies on information sourced from military platforms and journals. Where the same information is available from different sources, the Infodefensa platform was given preference due to its outstanding reputation.

Section fourth introduces an innovative section not covered by the 2009 and 2014 reports: Israel's global role in the design and production of border wall construction technologies (as the paradigm of a walled state), and its powerful network of Homeland Security companies producing such technologies. It examines Israel's influence and co-operation in wall-building on other borders around the world. This information is difficult to collect and generally based on press articles, government announcements, and the information provided by the companies involved. However, we can be sure that Israel's border industry is present in various ways in more countries than those detected here. The section includes a list of the numerous businesses related to Israeli border technology, to facilitate the work of other researchers and activists, and to inspire new reporting activities.

This report aims to reveal the functioning and multiple branches of the "combat proven" brand, to understand the seriousness of its ethical implications, and its ability to expand, using the example of the Spanish government to explore trade and industrial relationships, and a global approach to border control.

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1. Dual-use material, such as chemicals, can be used for both civil and military purposes.
2. The official report into the export of defence and dual-use material does not provide correct data regarding 'arms, munitions, and accessories', it includes results that are incompatible with those provided by the DataComex customs database, despite the fact that both the official report and the database use the same source: Spain's Department of Trade (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio). This report therefore takes both the report and the database into consideration.
3. *Homeland Security* (or its 'National Security' or 'Integral Security' equivalents) is understood to mean practices that reduce national vulnerability to global threats. It straddles traditional national security to address issues occurring both inside national borders (Interior ministries, police forces) and in international security (Ministries of Defence, armed forces). This concept underwent a major boom after the 9/11 attacks on the United States, when both internal and external threats, especially terrorism, came together.

2. ARMS BUSINESSES: THE CASE OF SPAIN

2.1 EXPORTING TO ISRAEL: FEEDING ITS MACHINERY

Israel is not a priority destination for Spanish arms. For example, in 2020 (the most recent year for which official statistics are available in the EU,) Spain approved 69 licences to export defence material to Israel (3.5% of a total of 1,981) for a value of €17,736,842 (0.066% of a total of €26,551,885,601 licences approved globally that year). The exports carried out in 2020 were valued at €477,288, 0.013% of a total value of €3,622,450,087 (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2021). The value of these licences was higher than usual and the value of exports lower than usual in that year.

Israel is not one of the main export destinations for European arms, which are predominantly sent from two countries: Germany and France. In 2020, these two countries combined represented 88% of the value of EU licences granted (a total of €938,364,821 – note that the United Kingdom is no longer included in the report). However, only 294 (52.8%) of the 557 licences granted by EU Member States were from France and Germany. And only six licences were refused, none by Spain. These six refusals were on the

grounds of criterion 1 (on three occasions), 2 (five occasions), 3 (two occasions), 4 (four occasions), and 7 (one occasion). Respectively, these criteria refer to respect of international commitments by EU members (criterion 1), respect for human rights in the destination country (2), its internal situation (existence of tensions or armed conflicts) (3), maintaining regional peace, security, or stability (4), and the risk of diversion or re-export in undesirable conditions (7). An analysis of how well Israel complies with these criteria is provided below.

According to the COARM database, EU member states authorised export licences to Israel for a total value of €5,381.13 million between 2013 and 2020, of which only €990.79 had been exported at the end of 2020. Therefore, most of these exports have yet to arrive.

The importance of exporting defence and dual-use material to Israel does not stem from their economic volume or the percentage of total exports these transfers represent. As we shall see, their importance lies in other kinds of trade and industrial relationships. However, the seriousness of exporting arms, in all probability in breach of Spanish and European legislation, should not be minimised. The following table details Spain's exports to Israel between 1998 and 2021 (values in thousands of euros).

Graph 1. Export Licences Granted by EU Countries (2020)

Italy: 21,399,240
Romania: 41,843,590
Spain: 17,736,842
Others: 31,353,326

Germany: 582,405,816

France: 243,606,007

Source: Own research based on
https://webgate.ec.europa.eu/eeasqap/sense/app/75fd8e6e-68ac-42dd-a078-f616633118bb/sheet/
fa51f148-1f04-4850-816a-01c0cfa5f16c/state/analysis

Table 1. Spanish Exports to Israel Between 1998 and 2021

Thousands of euros

| Year	Authorisations for the export of defence material	Exports of defence material	Exports of dual-use material	Exports of arms (TARIC 93)	Total
1995		273.32		161.60	
1996		2,724.12		151.82	
1997		544.06		49.31	
1998	No data	4,497.30	131.39	56.44	4,685.13
1999	No data	1,533.71	128.03	223.15	1,884.89
2000	No data	4,909.68	822.73	226.57	5,958.98
2001	1,314.19	487.97	99.20	165.99	753.16
2002	2,530.86	1,597.10	152.56	298.16	2,047.82
2003	734.48	1,005.80	244.29	289.34	1,539.43
2004	175.54	35.26	1,515.64	106.40	1,657.30
2005	953.12	273.73	41.32	173.64	488.69
2006	1,109.57	441.34	1,587.32	247.27	2,275.93
2007	4,365.31	1,515.93	576.81	214.27	2,307.01
2008	157.20	2,358.99	801.57	1,093.70	4,254.26
2009	2,805.95	790.64	622.28	3,062.65	4,475.57
2010	5,766.60	1,429.04	214.33	5,141.83	6,785.20
2011	11,955.20	472.55	99.17	2,822.39	3,394.11
2012	4,318.59	637.84	36.40	2,523.16	3,197.40
2013	5,968.28	4,884.47	2,205.28	5,460.55	12,550.30
2014	19,461.75	3,428.09	2,922.74	6,025.57	12,376.40
2015	2,225.36	2,187.27	5,934.42	1,144.64	9,266.33
2016	13,057.86	530.93	2,024.89	230.55	2,786.37
2017	1,408.00	1,386.56	4,093.92	703.67	6,184.15
2018	11,747.85	619.33	12,080.72	458.34	13,158.39
2019	9,375.75	856.63	2,751.83	2,126.61	5,735.07
2020	17,736.84	477.29	3,123.33	698.89	4,299.51
2021	13,010.80	3,452.97	545.73	235.71	
Total (2001-21)	**130,179.10**	**28,869.73**	**41,673.75**	**33,223.33**	**103,766.81**

Source: Own research based on data from Spain's Department of Trade, both from the annual reports: *Spanish Statistics on the Export of Defence Material, Other Material, and Dual Use Products and Technologies* (*Estadísticas Españolas de Exportación de Material de Defensa, de Otro Material y de Productos y Tecnologías de Doble Uso*), and from the statistics for Spanish overseas trade found in the DataComex database https://comercio. serviciosmin.gob.es/Datacomex/principal_comex_es.aspx

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**Graph 2. Spanish Exports to Israel
Between 2001 and 2021**

■ Authorisations defense material
■ Exports defense material
■ Exports double use material
■ Arms exports (TARIC93)
■ Total

Source: Own research based on the data from Table 1   *Thousands of Euros*

WHY DO EXPORTS TO ISRAEL BREACH SPANISH AND EUROPEAN LEGISLATION?

As well as being an ethical concern, exports of arms, defence and dual-use materials breach Spanish and European legislation. However, as a previous report showed (Pozo Marín, 2009), it would be difficult for a judge to uphold this assertion for three reasons. Firstly, there is a confusion between the literal wording of the text and its binding nature, given that, while its essence is in theory designed to regulate such exports (for preventive purposes), the text generally recommends rather than bans. The second reason is the instrumental and partisan use of concepts such as 'human rights', 'terrorism', 'armed conflict' or 'international law'. There are no official lists identifying countries on the basis of these concepts, and the interpretation of the situation in each location is subject to economic and commercial or private interests. Finally, export authorisation deliberations

are recorded in the minutes of the Inter-Ministerial Defence and Dual-Use Material Committee (JIMD-DU), which are secret. This makes it impossible to determine the various arguments used to approve the licences or how the criteria are interpreted in each case, which also makes it impossible to judge the decision properly in a country governed by the rule of law and accountability. One of the main reasons for enacting the Law was to subject these decisions to parliamentary scrutiny, and yet the Spanish parliament is unable to perform this duty in a sector governed by secrecy, which lacks transparency. Arms exports to Israel have been the subject of concern in Spain's House of Commons and among certain sectors of public opinion. However, the government has given minimal explanations, contradicting the essence of Spanish legislation, and defending decisions on the grounds that Israel is a democracy and that Spanish exports are not used to cause suffering (see examples in Pozo Marín, 2009).

Table 2. Non-compliance with the criteria of Common Position 2008/944/CFSP (and Spanish legislation)

Key

Criterion not infringed	Criterion 8
Possible infringement of the criterion	Criteria 1 and 5
Infringement of the criterion	Criterion 7
Flagrant infringement of the criterion	Criteria 2, 3, 4, and 6

Criterion	Breach
Criterion 1. Respect for the international obligations and commitments of EU Member States	Israel has not ratified any of the eight agreements referred to in the wording of points b), c), and d) of this criterion: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; the Chemical Weapons Convention; the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; the Anti-Personnel Landmine Convention. It does not form part of the Wassenaar Arrangement, the Australia Group, the Missile Technology Control Regime, or the Nuclear Suppliers Group.
Criterion 2. Respect for human rights in the country of final destination	Israel has been systematically condemned for human rights abuses by the U.N. Human Rights Committee / Council, the European Union, and organizations such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Political Terror Scale: Since 1988 its score has never been below '4' (except in 2019, when it scored 3), and it has always scored between 4 and 5, on a scale of 1 (lowest) to 5 (highest).
Criterion 3. Internal situation in the country of final destination (existence of tensions or armed conflicts)	Israel has often been classified as being in a situation of armed conflict by the main conflict think-tanks (SIPRI, University of Heidelberg, University of Maryland, and School of Culture of Peace (Autonomous University of Barcelona)).
Criterion 4. Preservation of regional peace, security and stability	Recent regional armed conflicts (e.g. in Lebanon (2006) or Syria). Permanent tensions and mutual threats with Iran. Possibility of regional armed conflict. Israeli military incursions into Syria. Military occupations in Syria and Lebanon. Latent tensions with Syria, Saudi Arabia, Lebanon (Hezbollah), Iran, particularly following Israeli military incursions into the occupied territories. Regional arms race, including weapons of mass destruction.
Criterion 5. National security of the Member States and of the territories under their responsibility, as well as that of friendly and allied countries	Some EU member states' allies do not have diplomatic relations with Israel and are in permanent tension with Tel Aviv. The Israel/Palestine conflict is at the heart of a polarization between part of the Islamic world and part of the Western world, a fact used by various armed organizations. Israel has the potential to destabilize the region, and ultimately the world.
Criterion 6. Behaviour of the buyer country, as regards in particular its attitude to terrorism and international law	Israel has breached numerous binding United Nations resolutions, notably resolutions 242 (1967) and 338 (1973). The United States has vetoed at least 42 resolutions intended to condemn or severely criticise Israel. Israel has not ratified any of the three instruments expressly referred to: the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention, and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Severe and massive violations of International Humanitarian Law (especially in Lebanon in 2006 and on numerous occasions in Gaza). The establishment of permanent settlements in the occupied territories is in violation of various articles of the IV Geneva Convention. The wall separating Israel and the West Bank is in breach of international law.
Criterion 7. Risk of diversion or re-export under undesirable conditions	Israel has re-exported to countries at war or that systematically violate human rights, and its exports to highly-questionable regimes are well known. Spain exports military equipment and components that can then be re-exported to Israel (especially from the United States). A large proportion of Spanish exports to Israel are re-exported to third countries.
Criterion 8. Compatibility of arms exports with the technical and economic capacity of the recipient country	Israel is a rich country, and it has economic capability and military know-how. Despite the fact that Israel spends more on defence than on health and education, its social spending is often higher than in Spain. Although social spending ought to increase, arms exports to Israel may not violate the spirit of the wording of this criterion.

Source: Own research based on an adaptation of the Pozo Marín source, 2009: 43

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REFUSAL OF EXPORT LICENCES

Spain refuses very few licences. For example, in 2021 not a single export licence for defence material was refused to any country, and the same was true of riot-control material (Secretaría de Comercio de España, 2022). This lack of refusals is noteworthy. Although rare, some licences are refused every year. However, in the case of Israel, and despite the controversy that exporting arms to this country creates (because of its behaviour and situation), there is no official record of any refusal to authorise the export of Spanish defence material prior to 2015. Since then, five licences have been refused: in 2015, 2017, and 2019. We are also aware of six licences for exporting dual-use material to Israel being refused.

Other EU countries are also not known to refuse licences for Israel. Between 2013 and 2020, all members combined refused a total of 40 licences (out of a total of 5,757 granted over those eight years), on the grounds of almost all of the criteria (except number eight, which is notable for being the only criteria not infringed in the table): criterion 1 (on 7 occasions), 2 (16), 3 (10), 4 (15), 5 (1), 6 (3), and 7 (14). The main concerns about Israel were its human-rights situation, regional instability, the risk of diversion, and internal armed conflict. Only 4 of the 40 refusals came from Spain (the fifth Spanish refusal was for riot-control,

not defence material). These concerns have led to consultations among EU countries, but not with Spain. The EU Common Position, and previously the Code of Conduct governing arms exports, provides for a consultation mechanism. When a Member State receives an application for authorisation to export material that is 'essentially identical' to another for which export (to the same destination country) was refused by another Member State, that Member State must be consulted before the authorisation can be approved. These consultations are not public. As the Ministry of Industry, Tourism, and Trade (Ministerio de Industria, Turismo y Comercio) stated many years ago, Spain checks the European database of denied arms exports, and according to statements by Ministry authorities, no export application that was 'essentially identical' to another previously refused by another Member State has ever been approved (Bromley, 2008: 47). However, in answering request for information number 001-049921 of 19 November 2020 by one of the authors (pursuant to Law 19/2013 of 9 December on Transparency, Access to Public Information, and Good Governance), which included the question "How many times has Spain consulted EU Member States with regard to export authorisations and exports to Israel, and how many replies has it received?" the government's response was clear: "No specific consultations have been made with regard to this destination country" in the history of the relations between the two countries.

Table 3. Licenses Spain has Denied Israel

Year	# licences	Material	Reason or criterion cited for refusal
Defence material			
2015	1	riot-control material - rubber-bullet cartridges	'Possible use in internal repression'
	1	'rocket-propellant substance'	Criterion 4 (Preservation of regional peace, security and stability)
2017	2	'10 cannons for rifle deployment and 17 fire-controls for tanks, for a total value of €1.9 million	Criterion 4
2019	1	'2,000 handcuffs' (riot-control material), valued at €17,000 for the Israeli police	'Possible use in internal repression', possible violation of human rights (González, 2020a). Criteria 2 and 3 (situation regarding human rights and armed conflict)
Dual-use material			
2019	1	550 inertial measurement units for unmanned vehicles, valued at €95,550	Risk of military use
2019	1	IT security devices worth €10 million	Doubts as to end user
2020	4	'470 inertial measurement units and 1 magnetometer valued at €700,837'	Refused as end user unknown

Source: Own research based on reports by Spain's Department of Trade

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EXAMPLES OF EXPORTS

- Alpha Unmanned Systems, a Spanish company located in San Sebastián de los Reyes (Madrid), sold eight Alpha 800 unmanned helicopters to the Israeli military company Sky Sapience (Alpha Unmanned Systems, *2017*). This Israeli military company was identified as participating in military operations along the Gaza Strip border (Tarnopolsky, 2018). Alpha Unmanned Systems is not merely a military company, and it specializes in unmanned aerial vehicles. However, at the Israeli ISDEF fair (Israel Defense & HLS Expo) it was presented as 'Alpha Security and Defense' (ISDEF, 2019), and in fact its products include sensitive technology and its exports require JIMMDU authorisation.

- In August 2014, JIMMDU authorised the export of two Sniper unmanned helicopters to a public body attached to the Israeli Ministry of Agriculture, known as Agricultural Engineering The Volcani Center (Alpha Unmanned Systems, 2015). The Israeli Ministry of Agriculture undertook not to re-export it, sell it for export, or transfer it to a third country, but in November 2016, Minister of Agriculture, Uri Ariel, gifted it to Russian Prime Minister, Dmitry Medvedev, without seeking permission from the Spanish authorities, and while Russia was subject to EU sanctions for its annexation of Crimea since 2014. These sanctions included the type of product given away (González, 2016; BBC, 2016). This act led to a complaint by the Spanish government, and is an example of how easily acts contrary to the law on arms exports can occur. There is no record of any consequences, or of the helicopter being returned.

2.2 IMPORTING FROM ISRAEL, MAINTAINING THE OCCUPATION

In Spain and in Europe, legislation expressly governs arms exports and entails the official publication of statistics relating to these transfers. However, imports are not governed by similar legislation. As a result, there are discrepancies in the data reported by different sources. For example, the Trade database specifies that arms imports from Israel in 2017 were worth €10.2 million. However, the Ministry of Defence raised that figure to €29.15 million, positioning Israel as the ninth-biggest exporter of defence materials to Spain (and the biggest non-NATO member), at 0.9% of total Defence imports (Germany and France alone accounted for 81% of these imports) (Ministerio de Defensa de España, 2017: 35). In any event, it is well known that Spain spends much more on buying arms from Israel that it generates through arms sales to the same country. Since 2008, both imports and exports have increased greatly, but the trade gap has been significantly in favour of imports. In the 21 years from 2001 to 2021, Spain has exported defence and dual-use material and light weapons valued at nearly €104 million. Compare this sum to the amount spent on acquiring Rafael *Spike* missiles alone: €364 million paid by Spain's Ministry of Defence (see the break-down below).

Given that, as mentioned earlier, Israel is in a situation in which European and Spanish legislation strongly advise against the export of arms, this balance in favour of imports may be sensible. However, Israel does not need Spanish arms (Pozo Marín, 2014): its military industry is more advanced and more global, and Spain exports very little to Israel in comparison with France, Germany, or (mainly) the United States, where most of

Graph 3. Israel – Spain Imports and Exports (1995-2021)

Source: Own research based on: Spain's Ministry of Defence, 2017, and Pozo Marín 2014

The "Combat Proven" slogan is currently not used, but it is mentioned explicitly in some of the product descriptions

the military material received by Tel Aviv comes from. So importing Israeli arms systems can be as questionable as exports, for two reasons. Firstly, these imports facilitate Israel's militarisation and *securitization*, as well as its military occupations. Occupations are very costly, and Israel needs buyers to make them viable. Reducing internal costs by over-producing, then exporting the surplus (three quarters of production) is what makes it viable. The armed forces are usually the arms industries' main customer. The cost per unit produced paid by the state varies according to whether its industries only produce the amount needed by the armed forces, or whether they manufacture a higher number of units and export the surplus. As a hypothetical example, if building a tank costs €10 million, then building ten may only cost €50 million, which halves the unit cost if the surplus nine are exported. This is why governments like arms exports, because they lower costs. In Israel, the domestic market is probably 'too small' to support its industry and keep prices 'reasonable' (Ben David, 2013). The Israeli military industry depends on international trade (Israeli Government, 2007).

The second reason concerns the added value of Israeli arms. Israel exports highly-developed military technology thanks to its accumulated experience. Itamar Graff, Principal Director of the Israeli Defence delegation in Spain, acknowledged that Israel (including the Occupied Territories) is "a 'laboratory' of means of warfare and new defence technologies, for one simple reason: the constant and increasingly sophisticated threats to which it has been subjected since its creation as a State and its ongoing struggle to survive." (Mirkin, 2009). One of the major reasons for the speed at which Israeli in-

dustry can carry out its research & development programmes and progress to the operational stage is the frequency of Israeli military operations (Navarro, 2006: 4). In the words of Itamar Graff: "Unlike other countries, in Israel an engineer developing a technology serves simultaneously in the army as a foot soldier or the head of a unit of reserves, so they experience Israeli Defence Forces needs first hand. This daily interaction between the industry and the army allows flexibility, improvisation, creativity, and a considerable reduction in project timeframes" (Mirkin, 2009).

Documentary film *The Lab*, by Israeli director Yotam Feldman, examines the Israeli military industry and its relationship with political, economic, and military decisions. According to Feldman, in an interview (Ilani, 2013):

"States in which an overwhelming majority of citizens denounce the actions of the Israeli army in Gaza actually make these actions possible by buying weapons tested there. This is essential for the security industry in Israel, the only kind of industry that exports more than it sells to the local market. Therefore, this purchase also goes to the IDF, who ensures that these industries develop new weapons to be used in the next war in Gaza.
[...]
Israel exports the Rafael missiles used to kill in Gaza, IAI drones, combat methods of General Aviv Kochavi and Magal separation walls, but also lawyers, experts in population management in the manner of the civil administration in Israel on the West Bank, and even the ethics of war.
[...]
This approach pays off. A key player in the defense industry told me that the performance testing run in the Gaza Strip of

the Elbit BMS (Battle Management System, a system similar to the Internet for ground forces), a large project estimated to be worth one billion dollars, has allowed Elbit to raise its price in an agreement signed one year later with Australia. The same goes for Rafael. The company openly declared that it would take advantage of the escalation that preceded the Pillar Defensive operation - with the first operational use of the Iron Dome - to raise about 500 million shekels (about $135 million) through the issuance of bonds. An IAI (Israel Aerospace Industries) seller said that killings and operations in Gaza produce an of tens of points percentage in the sales of the company."

In Spain, as in other countries, cutting-edge products and technology are sold as "combat proven". Examples include Rafael *Spike* missiles, drones by IAI and Elbit Systems, Rafael terrestrial vehicle turrets, Elbit Systems mortar systems, or tank munitions by Israel Military Industries Ltd. (IMI Systems). These manufacturers have generated some of the highest profits from military occupations and tensions in the region, and all of these products have been advertised as "combat proven" in Gaza.

3. INDUSTRIAL COOPERATION BUSINESSES: THE CASE OF SPAIN

Business relations between the two countries in the sector we are exploring can take at least four different forms, as examined below. The objectives for these industrial relationships include: to gain access to domestic or third country markets (e.g. Latin America and the Arab world, or to industrial programmes run by NATO or the EU) where some of these companies' connections have added value.

3.1 SUBSIDIARIES: LOCALIZE AND NATIONALIZE (OUTSIDE ISRAEL)

No examples of Spanish military companies are known to exist in Israel. However, Israeli companies have been established in Spain in order to access (with guarantees) Spanish contracts. Ministries of Defence tend to prioritise domestic companies when awarding contracts. So an Israeli subsidiary that is 100% Spanish on paper has a better chance of winning a Spanish contract than its Israeli parent company. The best-known examples of such companies are perhaps: PAP Tecnos, Aeronautics, and Magal.

■ *PAP Tecnos* is an important supplier of the Spanish armed forces. This company is totally "Spanish" while also being a subsidiary of Rafael: a totally

"Israeli" company. PAP Tecnos was established as PAP Logística in 1994 and bought by Rafael in 2010 (Infodefensa, 2011a). PAP Tecnos sub-contracts to other Spanish companies with strong links to the Israeli defence industry: Tecnobit and Expal (*Valpolini, 2021*). PAP Tecnos upgrades the Reccelite pods used by F/A-18s (or C.15) and works with Indra on monitoring the Litening III pods which determine targets in Eurofighter Typhoons (C.16) for the Spanish air force. Litening and Reccelite pods are made by Rafael. The former "is a target designation container (…) that increases the aircraft's effectiveness against terrestrial targets day and night and in all weather conditions." The Reccelite is "a reconnaissance system (…) used to stream live video images via a data link to terrestrial stations and tactical receivers in a range of approximately 100 miles." Both are fitted to the F-18 combat aircraft fleet operated by Spain's Air Force. Tecnobit has a contract to maintain the pods worth €1 million euros over two years (2020-2021), and the entire contract is worth €2.2 million, including an extra €1 million for extensions and €200,000 for planned modifications (Infodefensa, 2020a). Tecnobit also secured an earlier contract to maintain these pods on the F-18 at the Zaragoza, Torrejón de Ardoz (Madrid), and Gando (Gran Canaria) air bases; and for the repair of pod support equipment worth €651,000 over two years, which expired in

November 2020 (Infodefensa, 2019a). PAP Tecnos supplies Spain's army with Mini Samson remotely-controlled stations, and 12.7 mm machine-guns on RG-31 MRAPs vehicles (*Valpolini, 2021*). Rafael Spike missiles are probably the most significant contribution. Both Spain's army and navy have used the LR and ER models for years, and Tiger helicopters also use them. The LR2 model now aims to dominate the market, including on VCR 8x8 vehicles (*Valpolini, 2021*).

■ *Aeronautics Enterprise Española (AEE)* is the Spanish subsidiary of Israeli holding company Aeronautics Defense Systems, which manufactures products including unmanned vehicles for military purposes. This Spanish company was established in 2006 and is located in the Boecillo Technology Park in Valladolid. For four years, the AEE Chairperson, and Aeronautics Defense Systems Deputy Chairperson, was the Israeli Ministry of Defence representative at the embassy in Spain (F. del Corral, 2008b). He stated that the reasons for establishing this subsidiary in Spain included gaining access to subsidies from Castile and Leon. AEE signed agreements with the autonomous community's former Cabinet Office (Consejería de Presidencia) and Home and Justice Office (Consejería de Interior y Justicia) for surveillance and the capture and streaming of images (F. del Corral, 2008b). This was Aeronautics' first European outfit, from which it also hoped to access Latin America and North Africa (F. del Corral, 2008b).

■ *Magal Spain* is the Spanish subsidiary of multinational company Magal, founded in 1967 as a division of Israeli company IAI. Magal is a leading company in smart perimeter surveillance, access-control, and cyber-security, *inter alia*. Its Spanish business is flourishing, and it is responsible for security, especially perimeter security, at ports (Huelva, Gijon, Tarragona, and Ceuta), airports (Barcelona, Palma de Majorca, Malaga, Zaragoza, Reus, and Melilla), critical infrastructure (Endesa, Enagás, and Red Eléctrica), and businesses (including chemical company Vopak Terquimsa - Tarragona and Barcelona, and Inovyn - Martorell), energy company Exolum, at automobile industry sites, such as Mercedes-Benz (Vitoria) or Valeo (Martos, Jaen); and the electricity power line between Spain and France, or the El Arenosillo Test Centre (CEDEA) in Mazagón (Huelva), which is 'the main test-bed equipped for aerospace vehicle experiments by Spain's Ministry of Defence'.[4] According to its own publicity (Magal, n.d.), the Israeli multinational would also have as clients in Spain the Air Force, the Ministry of Defence, the "Na-

tional Guard", the Government, "high security prisons", the media group TV3 and VIP personalities that it does not disclose "for security reasons". According to a report by the Observatory on Business and Human Rights in North Africa and the Middle East (ODHE), "Magal S3 is a key and necessary company for Israel's system of occupation and apartheid and, therefore, its profitable activities are illegal and violate international law. In this sense, the contracting of Magal S3's security services and products demonstrates a serious lack of responsibility on the part of the Spanish and Catalan public administrations for not contributing to ensuring compliance with international law by Israel and the rest of the actors operating with its consent or promotion. This collusion could amount to a violation of the 2014 EU public procurement directives, recently transposed into domestic law through Decree Law 3/2016 on urgent measures in the field of public procurement" (Camps-Febrer et al., 2017: 57).

Currently the three Israeli parent companies converge into a single giant: Rafael Aeronautics was acquired by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems in 2019 *(Israel Financial Inside*, 2019), and Magal joined Aeronautics in 2021 (Magal, 2021).

■ *Guardian Spain Homeland Security.* It is the Spanish subsidiary of the Israeli company Guardian Holdings LTD, and operates as a representative in Spain of the main Israeli manufacturers of police and military equipment. The other three business lines are related to the import and distribution of fire and emergency equipment, specialised security training both in Spain and Israel, and the protection of people, events and delegations. In 2014, the company displayed on its website the logos of its customers (see attached screen print). Those clients included, according to Guardian, the Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Interior, Presidency of the Government, Tax Agency, Navy, Royal Household, Air Force, Israeli Embassy, Army, Ertzaintza, Guardia Civil, Mossos d'Esquadra, Navarre Police and National Police. These logos do not appear on its website today.

The Guardian does not hide its links to Israeli security and defence. On the contrary, it uses them as a publicity stunt. It defends and uses the "Israel" brand, and has promoted its products and services as "100% made in Israel". For example, Guardian advertises on its website that it has supplied thousands of bulletproof vests in Spain to the Guardia Civil, National Police, Spanish Army and local and regional police. These supplies include 12,324 bulletproof vests for external use for the Guardia Civil for a contract valued at €3,500,000 (Armas.es, 2010) or another 488 exter-

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4. Details of all these examples can be found on the Magal website, https://www.ms3.es/es/noticias/

COMBAT PROVEN BUSINESS

Image 2. Guardian Spain Homeland Security customers

Source: Screen print of their corporate website from 2014, visible at:
https://web.archive.org/web/20140123102735/http://www.guardianspain.com:80/clientes/

nal bulletproof vests for the Mossos d'Esquada (Armas.es, 2008). Of the same brand as these waistcoats were the 100 RBH 303 AU helmets and bulletproof screens supplied to the Guardia Civil (Armas.es, 2009). On its website, Guardian stresses that the waistcoats have been 'combat proven', 'used extensively by the Israeli army and police forces' and that they are 'made in Israel' products. Also advertised on its website with these three characteristics in quotation marks are the pistols and assault rifles recently supplied to the Guardia Civil by the Israeli company Emtan-Karmiel. Both contracts were won by Guardian Spain Homeland Security on behalf of Emtan-Karmiel. The contract for the MZ-4P assault rifles was for 5.93 million euros and could involve up to 5,800 units (Carrasco, 2022). The contract for the pistols was for 6,000 units, semi-automatic 9mm Parabellum "Ramon" model, for 1.95 million euros (the contract had a budget of almost three million) (Infodefensa, 2021a). Finally, the tender was extended to cover 9,216 pistols (A.R.E., 2022). On the other hand, different Basque institutions (the Government, the provincial councils, the Ertzaintza and city councils such as Bilbao, Santurtzi, Leioa or Bermeo, among others) have reportedly awarded Guardian Defence & Homeland Security and its distributors 1.66 million euros in police equipment, through 150 public contracts, 60% of which were formalised between 2018 and 2020 (Barcenilla, 2022a). This material is said to include "stun and diversionary grenade carriers", which have been described by human rights organisations as "weapons of covert lethality" (Barcenilla, 2022b).

3.2 BIDDING WITHOUT COMPETING (MUCH): ARMY SUPPLIES

This case is not a question of subsidiaries, but of strategic co-operation agreements that give access to the domestic markets of partner companies. There are many examples of such collaborations. The following are some of the most recent and significant:

- *Unmanned terrestrial vehicles*. "The legionnaires have already tested unmanned terrestrial systems such as the LR1 transport platform by Israeli company IAI" (Infodefensa, 2020b; Infodefensa, 2019b).

- *'Spanish' drones in Iraq (RPAS Orbiter by Aeronautics)*. These were used in the Inherent Resolve operation in Syria and Iraq. The system was acquired through a €3.1 million contract with the Directorate-General for Arms and Equipment (Dirección General de Armamento y Material - DGAM) for overseas operations in October 2018. The drones are designed for "intelligence, surveillance, target-acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR) missions" and can carry a payload of up to 5 kg (Infodefensa, 2019c).

- *'Spanish' drones in Afghanistan (IAI Searcher)*. For "surveillance, reconnaissance, target-acquisition, artillery-adjustment, and damage-assessment tasks." Used by Spain in Afghanistan between 2008 and summer 2014. RPAS Searchers were acquired between 2007 and 2010, and became the backbone of the Autonomous Sensorized Intelligence Platform (Plataforma Autónoma Sensorizada de Inteligencia - PASI). IAI modernized Spain's RPAS Searchers, which were certified and tested in Israel at the Ein Shemer airfield in June 2018 (Infodefensa, 2018a).

- *Leopard tank munition*. Award of a batch of 1,797 *Tpcsds-T* 120 mm shots, 120 x570 mm, to IMI Systems for €3,565,966 for Leopard tank cannon. Spain has used the Leopard vehicles in Latvia, as part of

NATO's Enhanced Forward Presence (eFP) mission commenced in mid 2017 (Infodefensa, 2019d). Meanwhile, the Spanish army recommended Elbit Systems for a €2.8 million contract for 1,250 Heat (High Explosive Anti-Tank) 120 x 570 mm TP-T shots for the Leopards (Infodefensa, 2019e; State Procurement, 2019), although the outcome of the tender is not known.

■ *Acquisition of 5.56 X 45 mm* ordinary NATO standard cartridges. These are Economic Affairs Department of the Logistical Support Command (Jefatura de Asuntos Económicos del Mando de Apoyo Logístico) contracts awarded to IMI Systems, worth €678,398.70 (file 2091117036100, awarded on 21 September 2017) and €2,072,000 (file 2091119019800, of 23 October 2019, available on Spain's national procurement portal). Both contracts were carried out in Israel.

■ *Frequency jammers for vehicles*. This is an important contract worth €65,470,725 signed by the GDAM Armaments and Materiel Procurement Sub-Directorate-General (Subdirección General de Adquisiciones de Armamento y Material) and running until February 2023, awarded to Israeli company Netline Communications Technologies (NCT). NCT will supply Spain's Ministry of Defence with the *C-Guardian RJ (Reactive Jamming)* system, used by the Israeli Defence Forces. The contract covers equipment installation, auxiliary material, spares for a number of years, the corresponding training courses, and an assessment of the configuration of new platforms (Infodefensa, 2019f; Infodefensa, 2019g).

■ *Cardom Mortar by Elbit Systems.* The 81 mm Cardom system was mounted on a Urovesa Vamtac S3. Spain's territorial army acquired six Cardom mortars in 2011 for close to €7 million, and they were used in Afghanistan. They were replaced by a 120 mm system in 2020 (Infodefensa, 2018b).

■ *Spike Missiles.* The anti-tank missile programme (Spike LR) comes from a 2002 agreement signed between Santa Bárbara Sistemas and Rafael for the supply of 260 fire positions and 2,550 medium-range anti-tank missiles (4 km) to replace the Dragón system used by Spain's marines, and Milan missiles for its territorial army. It was one of Spain's Ministry of Defence's Special Arms Programmes, and it is also one of Spain's most significant purchases from the Israeli military industry, at a cost of €364 million to the Ministry of Defence. Although the missiles were developed by Rafael, they are wholly made and assembled in Spain by GDELD-SBS under a technology transfer contract.

In 2018, the Cabinet Meeting authorised a third addendum to the co-operation agreement with Santa Bárbara Sistemas for the technological and industrial development of the Spike missiles programme (Infodefensa, 2018c). According to Human Rights Watch, this kind of missile was used by IDF drones during attacks on Gaza as part of the 2009 Cast Lead operation, killing at least 48 people (Human Rights Watch, 2009: 3).

3.3 LONG TERM STRATEGIC COLLABORATION

The objective of long term strategic collaboration is not to secure public contracts, but to provide sub-products or components for equipment made by domestic companies, which in turn gain public contracts. Again there are numerous examples of such partnerships.

■ *Tecnobit-Rafael optronic cameras*. Tecnobit-Grupo Oesía has 100% Spanish capital and frequently works with Rafael. For example, they signed a technological and strategic collaboration agreement to integrate the Orison camera into all 30 mm turrets made by the Israeli firm. This collaboration was also highlighted in Rafael's unsuccessful bid to equip Spanish VCR 8x8 turrets (Infodefensa, 2020c).

■ *Loitering Munitions*. These are known as 'exploration' or 'suicide drones', i.e. reconnaissance systems for in-flight target assignment. They are sold as a "cross between a UAV and a missile"; which can attack, recover, or return to exploration mode. They are developed by Israeli company Uvision, which "works with Spanish companies to integrate Hero munition into platforms." For example, Univision integrated its *Loitering* Hero-30 munition into the Neton special-operations vehicle, an all-terrain platform by Spanish company Einsa (Infodefensa, 2020d).

■ *Castor sapper combat vehicles (Vcap)*. Produced by GDELS-Santa Barbara Sistemas, these are an evolution of the Pizarro armoured track vehicle. Spain's territorial army expected to receive 36 units between 2020 and 2021 (Infodefensa, 2019h). They are equipped with a Mini Samson 12.70 mm remote-control weapons station (RCWS) made by Rafael (Carrasco, 2019a).

■ *Terrestrial turrets for armoured vehicles*. Spain's navy signed a contract with PAP Tecnos and Rafael for the supply, installation, and integrated logistical support for remote-control weapons, on a batch of ten Mini Samson terrestrial turrets worth €1.6 million. Installation was intended for Unprepared Wading versions of Urovesa Vamtac ST5 vehicles for the

marines, six turrets were to be delivered in 2019 and four between 2020 and 2022 (Infodefensa, 2019i).

■ *R&D robotic kit*. Together with Urovesa and IAI, Spanish public company Navantia designed a robotic kit for an unmanned vehicle operated from a remote control station (Carrasco, 2019b).

■ *R&D infra-red and surveillance system.* Israeli company Opgal Optronics and Spanish companies Everis Spain SL and ISDEFE worked on a project to project infra-red images, advanced vision and surveillance solutions. A further three Israeli companies (including the co-ordinator) also took part alongside another five firms in an EU FP-7 project to develop new communications technologies to support intervention forces in crises. The project was dubbed INFRA and cost €3.8 million, of which €2.6 million were funded by the EU, according to the CORDIS database.

3.4 ACCESS TO INTERNATIONAL MARKETS

Submitting a bid with industrial partners from the tender country is seen as a practical necessity, given Europe's constant encouragement of domestic industry. But it can sometimes be advantageous to be supported by companies from third countries where these bring added value through relationships with local partners. For example, in March 2019 an industrial forum was held between Spanish and Israeli companies. One of the Israelis stated aims was to 'identify potential collaborations to facilitate exports of Israeli material to third-country markets such as South America and the Middle East' (Villarejo, 2019). Remember that the vast majority of Arab or Islamic countries do not have diplomatic relations with Israel and may even ban its products, so alliances with companies from countries with good relations may be one of the few ways to secure contracts. Israeli companies are therefore interested in working with Spanish firms with business relationships in such places. And Spanish firms may find it commercially interesting to ally themselves with the *Israel brand* of cutting-edge technology and "combat proven" experience. This forum was held on campus at the Marañosa Technological Institute (Instituto Tecnológico de la Marañosa - INTA), and hosted by DGAM, and SIBAT - an Israeli Ministry of Defence body. It was attended by the most powerful Israeli companies, including: IAI and its subsidiaries ELTA and MALAT, Rafael, Elbit Systems, Aeronautics, Verint, Bluebird Aero Systems, and Uvision (Navarro, 2019).

■ *Re-exporting to other countries*. Whether or not the products are modified. For example, in 2021 defence material was exported to Israel for re-export to other countries, including "aviation bomb shells for re-export to the Indian Air Force", "an armoured vehicle for re-export to the Armed Forces of the Philippines" or "infra-red camera components for re-export to the United States Navy" (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2022:10). In 2013 components for sports pistols were exported to Israel for assembly and re-export to the United States, as was a prototype gunsight system for the Indonesian National Armed Forces (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2014: 10).

■ *Electronics for military aircraft*. Includes the transfer of electronics for the aeronautical sector to Israel (for example, integrated circuits and electronic cards for image processing) to be incorporated into equipment destined for military aircraft in a large number of countries, as well as Spain, including Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Sweden, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and India (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2016: 38, 2017:38, 2018:40 and 2019:40).

■ *Turrets for Croatia's 8x8 programme*. This collaboration between Spanish company Navantia and Israeli company Elbit Systems was established for Navantia to manufacture 20 UT30MK2 30 mm turrets for the Patria AMV 8x8 exported to Croatia. Elbit will supply the 7.62 mm machine guns and the 30 mm turrets, including the Spike anti-tank missile (a Rafael partnership) (Infodefensa, 2020e).

■ *Shell and mortar grenade components for Thailand*. In 2019, 2020, and 2021, Spain exported guidance for artillery shells or self-propelled truck-mounted shells to Israel to be sent to Thailand's armed forces (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2018, 2019 and 2020: 10). In 2015 fuses for illuminating mortar grenades were exported to Israel destined for Thailand's Ministry of Defence (Secretaría de Estado de Comercio, 2016: 10).

3.5 ESPIONAGE

Pegasus is an intrusion and monitoring software from the Israeli company NSO Group Technologies, operated in large part by personnel from the Israeli Armed Forces. Thanks to a massive data breach and the collaborative investigative work of 80 journalists from different media outlets, it has come to light that human rights activists, lawyers and journalists in many parts of the world have been spied on through this programme (Kirchgaessner et al., 2021). According to the company, 'NSO does not operate the systems it sells to vetted government customers' (NSO Group, 2021). NSO only sells to states, and the Israeli Ministry of Defence closely regulates NSO, granting individual

export licences before its surveillance technology can be sold to a new country (Kirchgaessner et al., 2021). Customers would be armies (15%), law enforcement (38%) and intelligence agencies (51%), in 40 unspecified countries (Kirchgaessner et al., 2021). According to State Security sources (Fernandez, 2022), NSO Group distributes its Pegasus software 'in Western countries' through three firms: Dars Telecom (Italian-Spanish), Excem (Spanish with sites in Israel, the US, China and France) and BAE Systems (British). Excem belongs to the Hatchwell family, which is very close to Benjamin Netanyahu (Fernández, 2016). On the website of its technology division, it identifies the Guardia Civil, the National Police Corps, the Ministries of the Interior and Defence, the Mossos d'Esquadra and the Ertzaintza as clients.

■ *CNI / Ministry of Defence.* "Catalangate" is the name of the scandal of spying on public figures in Catalonia through the Pegasus programme because of their pro-independence militancy. According to the platform that investigated it, CitizenLab, this espionage would have affected at least 65 people, including presidents and former presidents of the Generalitat or the Parliament of Catalonia, members of the European Parliament, members of various political parties, lawyers for public figures and representatives of civil society (Scott-Railton et al., 2022). The CNI has acknowledged spying on 18 people, including Pere Aragonés (González et al., 2022), and sources close to the CNI have acknowledged possession of the Israeli Pegasus programme (González, 2020) - they would have acquired licences for six million euros (Gil, 2022). The company Cy4gate acquired Dars Telecom in December 2021. Citizen Lab has revealed that Cy4gate has been "involved in the distribution of a fake version of the WhatsApp messaging app used to steal information" (Zelaieta, 2022). According to the Spanish Association of Defence, Security, Aeronautics and Space Technology Companies (TEDAE), Dars Telecom also works for the Ministry of Defence and the Navarre Regional Police (Zelaieta, 2022a).

■ *Ertzaintza.* An investigation by El Salto has identified that the Israeli company Verint Systems, which in 2018 reportedly tried to buy NSO Group, has been the successful bidder since 2003 of the Ertzaintza's Telephone Monitoring System, and that, since 2006, Excem has been the "sole and exclusive representative in Spain" of Verint Systems. According to El Salto, at the time, Julián Garcia Vargas, former Minister of Defence, was Excem's CEO. This company now provides support, maintenance and supply services for the Ertzaintza's Legal Intervention Communications System, manufactured by Verint Systems. The total awarded to Verint Systems and its Spanish representative Excem exceeds 4.7 million euros (Zelaieta, 2022b). In 2021, a new tender was issued for the Ertzaintza's legal communications interception system. Two firms presented themselves: Excem and Dars Telecom, both intermediaries of NSO Group, perhaps the reason why, as El Salto's investigation suspected, the file had been declared "secret" for "security reasons". After 18 years, Verint-Excem had lost its contract as service provider. According to the investigation, irregularities abounded in the process, Excem appealed and won "partially", without it being clear whether the irregularities were due to the Pegasus case or to the clash of interests between the companies (Zelaieta, 2022a).

■ *National Police and Guardia Civil.* Dars Telecom has been the successful bidder of contracts for the acquisition of equipment and software and services for the legal interception of telecommunications of the SILC platform of the National Police Corps and the Civil Guard, for example, in 2015 (998,250 euros), 2018 (5,148,000 euros) and 2021 (5,000,000 euros) (Contratación del Sector Público, 2015, 2018, 2021).

CENTRE DELÀS
D'ESTUDIS
PER LA PAU

4. WALL BUSINESSES AROUND THE WORLD

4.1 ISRAEL AS THE PARADIGM OF A WALLED STATE

Israel is notable as a border wall builder for two main reasons. Firstly, because, as the data shows, it's the country with the largest number of border walls in the world: six. And secondly because those six walls and fences are on all six borders Israel shares with its neighbouring countries and territories: Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and Jordan. Its six border areas are shared with five different countries. In other words, all of Israel's borders include sections of separation wall or fencing. Israel, Morocco, (three walls) and the United Arab Emirates (two walls) are the only three countries in the world to have built walls or fences on all of their borders, which suggests that border walls are part of a particular political model.

The following table ranks countries that have built border walls in the last 50 years by their total number and in relation to their total number of shared borders. Israel leads the list with a total of six walls built on its total of six shared borders, followed by India with a total of three walled borders out of its total of six borders. Other outstanding cases include: Morocco, which has built walls on all of its borders (with Al-

geria, Western Sahara [occupied territory] and Spain), and the United Arab Emirates, which has two walls along its two borders with Saudi Arabia and Oman. It is worth noting that no accurate data on the extent of the walls is available, so the data in the table does not indicate whether the whole border has been walled, but it does allow us to talk about a political intention in the decision to build a border wall, regardless of its length.

Israel justifies building walls for two main reasons: terrorism and immigration. Israel's wall building policy began in 1973 in Syria, in the Golan Heights. This first case launched a particular way of building border walls, as it involved the military annexation of a territory followed by a wall which served to consolidate territorial conquest. This wall in Syria was expanded in 2013. In 1994, walls were built in the Gaza Strip, encircling the entire area. This totally isolated the Palestinian population and gave Israel complete control over who can enter and leave the territory, providing complete securitization of the movement of Palestinian people living in the Strip. This isolation and the successive attacks in the Gaza Strip have produced a range of humanitarian emergency situations over time, along with sustained blockades of supplies, which several organizations, including some from Israel, have described as "crimes against humanity" (United Nations, 2009).

Table 4. Countries Ranked by Walls Built Along Their Borders in the 1970-2020 Period

Country	Border walls	Borders
Israel	6	6
India	3	6
Iran	3	7
Morocco	3	3
Saudi Arabia	2	7
UAE	2	2
Spain	2	5
Hungary	2	7
Jordan	2	5
Kazakhstan	2	5
Turkmenistan	2	4
Turkey	2	8
Algeria	1	7
Austria	1	8
Azerbaijan	1	5
Botswana	1	4
Bulgaria	1	5
China	1	16
Cyprus	1	*
Egypt	1	4
Slovenia	1	4
United States of America	1	2
Estonia	1	2
Greece	1	4
Iraq	1	6
Kenya	1	5
Kyrgyzstan	1	4
Kuwait	1	2
Latvia	1	4
Lithuania	2	4
Macedonia	1	4
Myanmar/Burma	1	5
Nigeria	1	4
Norway	1	3
Oman	1	3
Pakistan (Durand Line)	1	4
United Kingdom	1	3
Russia (South Ossetia)	1	14
South Africa	2	6
Thailand	1	4
Tunisia	1	2
Ukraine	1	7
Uzbekistan	1	5

Source: Own work based on Ruiz Benedict, Akkerman and Brunet (2020).
*The case of Cyprus is particular, as the wall divides the North from the South of the island, as the result of its occupation by Turkey.

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Table 5. Israel's walls

Built by (nation)	State/territory	Estimated year of start of construction	Reasons given for construction
Israel	West Bank	2002	Terrorism
	Egypt	2011	Immigration
	Gaza Strip	1994	Terrorism
	Jordan	2015	Immigration, terrorism
	Lebanon	2012	Terrorism
	Syria	1973/2013	Immigration, terrorism

Source: Own work based on Ruiz Benedicto, Akkerman and Brunet (2020)

In 2002, the construction of the West Bank wall Israel claims is a border, was also based on the model of territorial annexation and occupation, as it fails to respect the Green Line border established by the 1967 agreements. In practice, the wall in the Occupied Territories consolidates the illegal expulsion of Palestinian people from their lands (Naciones Unidas, 2014), and the occupation of these lands by Israeli settlers. Amnesty International has declared that the wall violates international law on several occasions (Amnistía Internacional, 2004). Similarly, a range of organizations denounce the "Annexation Wall" or "Apartheid Wall" (Regan, 2016: 309), for its implications of territorial segregation and its disruption of the daily life and movement of Palestinian people, who not only find their property seized and themselves expelled from their own land and resources, they now also find freedom of movement impossible. Israel also built walls along its borders with Egypt in 2011, Lebanon in 2012 (in an area in which there is frequent tension between the countries), and Jordan in 2015.

These walls have a range of characteristics. They mostly aim to consolidate the forcible annexation of a territory. This is true of the walls built in Syria and the Occupied Territories. In the case of Jordan, Egypt and Lebanon, walls were built due to tensions, although they can actually heighten such tensions (Avdan and Gelpi, 2017: 17; Saddiki, 2017: 90). Finally, the walls that Israel claims are its borders in the Occupied Territories, are in some sections actually urban walls: in cities including Jerusalem and Hebron. So cities and villages are militarised by walls and the deployment of military technologies and forces, establishing a model of urban development based on segregation and inequality, in terms of access to city services and spaces.

Israel's walls are not just physical constructions, they include a range of technological systems designed to control movement including: surveillance cameras, automated turnstiles, remote forms of control, biometric card reading, and body scanners, which feed into a database network, recording the people moving around the territory (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016: 159). This means that the entire Palestinian population, as a community, is securitized, or turned into a threat, leading to the control and restriction of all their movements throughout the territory (Pallister-Wilkins, 2016: 155). In this sense, as Arieli affirms (2016: 495), *securitization* dominates social and political discourse, and gives the security industry considerable dominance over decision making and other political processes. As Pallister-Wilkins (2016: 158) notes, the wall in the Occupied Territories:

> "is a good illustration of the barrier as a disruption device (…) the occupying power can carry out a range of security practices that make the Palestinian population increasingly legible at the bio-political level."

In other words, it seeks to establish control over Palestinian people's way of life using various devices to record and disrupt their movement, under the discourse of security. This in turn constitutes a form of bio-politics, in Foucault's words, which is a form of control of life, in this case achieved by the occupying power's ability to exercise power. A concrete example of this implementation of bio-politics, based on the *securitization* of the Palestinian population, is the adoption of the *Citizenship and Entry to Israel* Act, which bans Palestinian spouses from entering the country, based on the risk of their eventual involvement in terrorist causes (Shamir, 2005: 203). This means the personal decisions of Palestinian people become potential threats in the eyes of the Israeli government.

When Regan analyses Israel's discourses, he stresses that the country uses what he calls the "fence-discourse" based on justifying the construction of walls and fences by the fact that they are designed to provide security and reinforce separation between countries, and people's, or in this case States' freedom to build walls and fences to protect themselves (Regan, 2015: 311). Fuste notes that walls like those built by Israel in the Occupied Territories, are based on legitimizing the dehumanization of the "other" (in this

case the Palestinian population,) based on the fact that they belong to communities that pose a risk and a danger (Fuste, 2010: 817). In other words, *securitization* justifies the underlying segregation behind the militarization of border spaces and wall construction.

Wall building has severe implications for Palestinian life and the Palestinian economy. First, in many cases, people are separated from their farmland, which is sometimes their only way to make a living, and they are also separated from their communities, and even their families. Secondly, Palestinian people's access to hospitals and other services, is restricted, especially in the case of urban walls. Thirdly, the restriction of mobility affects Palestinian workers, and Palestinian businesses, which suffer from restrictions on and slowing of their ability to move, given the controls between cities and urban environments (Naciones Unidas, 2014; Regan, 2016: 307; Saddiki, 2017: 18). Israel's walls are an example of how wall building can become a genuine structure of violence for a whole community, and of how walls become tools for implementing *apartheid* policies.

4.2 THE *HOMELAND SECURITY* BORDER INDUSTRY IN ISRAEL

Some 63 border walls have been built in the last 50 years. Of these, 57 went up since 1989 (in the past 30 years) and 45 since 2000 (in the past 20 years). This industry is growing in parallel to wall construction. Israel has some of the most experienced wall building industries: it is one of the main specializations of the industries exporting its security model (The Israeli export & International Cooperation Institute, 2012), and it holds the "combat proven" seal of the arms, control and surveillance technologies used against Palestinian people. The Israeli Ministry of Public Security (2012) promotes its border control experience as follows:

> "Today, Israeli companies are at the forefront of border security, offering sophisticated electronic fences and covert 'virtual fences' backed by video, radar and electrooptic surveillance sensor movement detection capabilities, and autonomous, unmanned, aerial, terrestrial and marine patrol vehicles. Computer systems provide sophisticated monitoring and control of people, vehicles and goods, ensuring that open borders don't become a security risk."

According to a report published by Market Research Future (2021), the global border security market is growing and will reach a value of over $65 billion in 2025. Some of the world's leading border management companies include: General Dynamics Corporation (USA), Raytheon Company (USA), Northrop Grumman Corporation (USA), Elbit Systems Ltd (Isra-

el), Leonardo SpA (Italy), Thales Group (France), Cobham PLC (United Kingdom), FLIR Systems, Inc. (USA), and BAE Systems Plc (United Kingdom) (Market Research Future, 2021). Dror Sharon, CEO at Magal Security Systems, one of the leading Israeli companies in building infrastructure for border control globally, notes the growth of this market:

> "Magal is a global leader in perimeter intrusion technologies. Our increasing earnings from this type of orders, providing sensors for active international borders, come from decades of experience providing systems that have beyond demonstrated their effectiveness on the ground. As countries around the world increasingly prioritize border security, and realize that without technology, the physical structure is not itself a suitable solution, we see this as a strong long-term driver of growth for Magal" (Cisco PrNewswire, 2019).

Magal Security Systems is the construction company responsible for Israel's walls with the Gaza Strip, and also with Egypt and Syria, in the occupied Golan Heights (Reed, 2016b). The company provides a range of border control services, including: long-range surveillance cameras and radars, sensors, biometric reading systems, control centres and mobile terminals for patrolling walls (Magal, 2022). In February 2021, it joined Rafael Advance Defense Systems through an agreement with its subsidiary: Aeronautics (Magal, 2021).

Israel has built a complex network of border security companies. The Israel Export Institute states it represents over 500 companies in the *Homeland Security* field (Israel Export Institute, 2022). It divides these companies into two categories: border control, and perimeter access control and security. A total of 173 companies with a relevant role in this respect have been identified. In other words, at least 35% of companies in the Israeli *Homeland Security* network develop technologies, systems and services that help strengthen border fences and walls, as well as other control and security systems. Of all these, Elbit Systems Ltd is the global Israeli benchmark. The company promotes itself as a provider of field-proven border systems:

> "Field-proven operational experience – Elbit Systems is a world leader in border defence and control management systems, with solutions deployed and fully operational in Israel, Europe, the United States and other locations with challenging borders. The company's renowned Digital Army Project (DAP) is derived from operational know-how gained from years of experience operating in some of the most complex environments around the world." (Elbit Systems, 2022)

Table 6 lists these companies and the type of border control systems or services they provide (they may also develop systems for other contexts). There is another parallel network of military companies involved in manufacturing drones, land and maritime vehicles, mines and other weapons that may also be used at borders in Israel and the countries to which they export.

4.3 THE INFLUENCE AND ROLE OF ISRAELI *HOMELAND SECURITY* IN THE MILITARIZATION OF GLOBAL BORDERS

The Israeli border construction and technology industry has an important global role, and as we have already noted, it is valued as being "field proven" or "combat proven", as are other kinds of weapons. There are numerous cases of cooperation between Israel Defense Technology and other countries, and these often include training and advice. The same applies to borders, which have taken on increasing importance in the construction of the concept of National Security.

The following section will analyse some of the cases in which the Israeli *Homeland Security* network or the government itself has influenced border implementation measures and policies in other countries. It is believed that more actual cases than those described here exist, due to the enormous industrial conglomerate of Israeli *Homeland Security* and the difficulty of tracking its network and agreements with other affiliates in other countries.

■ **The United States of America:** in 2016, Israeli giant Elbit Systems built a high-tech fence equipped with sensors and radars on the US border in southeast Arizona, known as the "Smart Wall", for the Department of *Homeland Security* (Reed, 2016a). As Shapira (2013: 252) notes, the company advises and works on wall construction around the world, including on the border between the USA and Mexico. Magal, another major Israeli company and the main player in "perimeter security" is also involved in maintaining the U.S. built sections of wall along the border with Mexico. In 2019, the company won a contract worth over $6 million to maintain peri-

Table 6. Israeli *Homeland Security* Companies with a Role in Border Control Systems

Company	System, technologies and services
A. OPTICAL COMPONENTS L.T.D	Manufacturer of quality specialist optics for military, medical and industrial applications.
A.B. KIDMA	Entry control systems, retractable bars, turnstiles, spikes, and high resistant security barriers.
Achidatex	Military and civilian grade protection against attacks.
AFCON Holdings Group	Electromechanical systems.
AGENT	Optimizing video surveillance cameras, coders, video management systems and alarm automation software.
Aleppo Systems International	End-to-end security platforms and communications systems.
Al-Sorag Grup Winbar	Perimeter security and protection solutions for buildings.
AMETOS	Strategic security solutions, risk analysis and tactical training.
Anteo	Critical infrastructure solutions.
ARPAL Defender	Aluminium and glass protection such as fences, specialist in protecting against explosions.
Asero	Senior global consultant specializing in HLS risk management.
AMSTAF	Surveillance land drones.
VISION	Artificial intelligence for the defence industry.
B.Rimon Agencies LTD	Command vehicles and mobile communications trailers for security agencies.
bdesign3D	3D models of critical environments.
BeST (Be-Strategic Solutions)	Crisis simulators.
BAT (Beit Alfa Technologies LTD)	Non-lethal weapons, riot control vehicles.
BIRD Aerosystems	Air safety, missile defence systems, sensors and surveillance.
Bluebird Aero Systems	Unmanned aerial systems.
BriefCam	Video analysis systems.
CAA	Improved firearms systems and tactical tools.
Carmor	Vehicles for military and national security applications.

Company	System, technologies and services
CDN Tech	Internal and external lighting for military vehicles.
BGI Grup	Complex entrances that include biometric access control, UVIS doors, bollards, barriers and turnstiles.
Cellint	Big data mobile phone analysis.
CommuniTake	Device security, encrypted communications.
Controp Precision Technologies	Electrooptic and movement control systems for surveillance applications.
Creomagic	CreoNet technology for secure connections for law enforcement forces.
Defensive Shield	Strategic operations and tactical solutions for security markets.
DEFENSOFT	Develops software and methodologies for planning large-scale border and perimeter security systems for government and industrial customers.
DSIT	SHIELD long-range sonar detection system.
EM Improvement	Security solutions, projects and training.
Clear-Cut Ltd	Information technology for command and control systems, and for the aerospace industry as well.
Elbit Systems	Real-time connectivity for border control.
EL-FAR	Advanced perimeter security solutions, 17 years' field-proven experience.
Elmo	Drones, camera systems, night vision systems and biometric technologies.
ElSight	Develops video and data transmission technologies used by the Israeli military police and HLS agencies.
Eltel	Develops and implements decision support solutions (DSS) and predictive analysis services for the Israel Defense Forces.
EMZA	Design and production of Emza WiseEye integrated outdoor perimeter protection.
ERM Advanced Telematics	Design, development and manufacture of innovative vehicle safety.
ESC BAZ	Electro-optical surveillance systems for national defence and security, thermal imaging solutions for border management.
Eurotech Communication Ltd	Encrypted and secure gateways.
eVigilo	Multi-channel massive notification and emergency warning solutions, the company points out that they have been tested in the field and during real events.
Fifth Dimension	Artificial Intelligence predictive intelligence databases.
Foresight Prudence	Develops its own national security solutions, information management platforms and intelligence.
Front Line	Personal protective equipment, promoted as being based on combat experience.
FST Biometrics	Biometric identification technology.
GAMA OPERATIONS	Phone security and automation, the only Israeli Defense Forces supplier, encrypted phone calls.
General Robotics	Advanced robotic platforms for the National Defense and Security markets.
Geospotx Ltd	360 Street View mapping system.
GG Robotics	Maintenance for X-ray machines, EoD robots, robotic systems and other products, is a global manufacturer of scanning and security equipment.
Gilat	Satellite broadband communications services.
Gilat Telecom	Mobile satellite solutions, satellite messaging, secure communications.
Gita Technologies	Real-time tactical interception systems for mobile phone and satellite location technologies.
GM Afcon	V-ALERT Perimeter Intrusion Detection System based on electronic sensors for security fences.
G-NIUS	Joint venture between IAI and Elbit Systems. It manufactures autonomous ground vehicles that it promotes as field-proven.
Goren Kidon	Security scans.
Greenlight	Aerial solutions involving drones, anti-drone systems, maritime surveillance, cyber-security, information gathering, data acquisition, surveillance tools and sensors, training.
Guesher Group	Threat management with a military and police approach.
HTS	Added-value image processing that provides vehicle and load data for border control and critical site access.
I.T.P. Novex	Real-time tracking devices, digital maps, data gathering, learning and movement patterns.
IDentytech Solutions	Complete identity management solutions and deployment integrating cameras, sensors and algorithms, biometric technologies with integrated chips and smart cards.

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Company	System, technologies and services
IMCO Industries	Military and civilian applications. Production of air, sea and land transport vehicles, missiles and autonomous drones, smoke grenade launch, LED night vision.
INKAS	Armour kits and advanced technology solutions for special vehicles.
Intelicomm	Specializing in voice, video and data communications with/without infrastructure, designed for difficult environments.
Intuview	Digital text analysis, analysis of formal social media messages related to a range of areas, applications that extracts the implicit meaning of text through ontology mapping and semantic relationships.
ISDS Brazil	International security consultancy.
ISPRA	Manufacture and marketing of non-lethal riot control devices, anti-terrorist and police equipment.
Israel Military Industries	The company is fully owned by the Israeli government, integrated security solutions.
Israel Aerospace Industries	Radar systems with integrated sensors in secure information networks, simulation training and cyber-intelligence.
IsraTeam	Consultancy and assessment of potential threats, strategy analysis. Team of senior Israeli Civil Defense reserve officers.
Kanfit	Aerospace engineering, parts for cabin structures and main landing gear doors, RTM chaff and flare magazines, missile and bomb parts, airborne and space antennas.
KiloLambda	Light control solutions.
LDS Laser Detect Systems	Laser detection systems.
LeadSpotting	Open source intelligence platform scans social networks and other Internet sources to collect publications, pages, images and videos and issue unique, text-based alerts and recognition algorithms for images and videos.
Lior Textile Ind	Produces personal protection equipment market, 40 years' cooperation with the Israel Defense Forces, tactical body armour, CBRN clothing, ballistic insertions and others.
LiveU	Portable solutions for live video transmission. Field-proven.
Lotan Group International	Advice on specific issues or comprehensive solutions, including the ones related to security.
M.I.P. Security	Strategic security assessments, design and security improvement projects, as well as staff training.
Maavarim Group	Provision of comprehensive national security services worldwide.
Magal Security Systems	Perimeter barriers, drones, cameras, sensors, biometric reading systems.
Magen	Interception and intelligence technology that provides access to the most valuable, private target data stored on smartphones.
Magllan Ltd	Security and planning consultancy and assessment, project management, integration and training. Magllan team members are leading experts in special military operations, national security, counter-terrorism and intelligence, who gained their experience in the Israel Defense Forces.
Magna BSP	Intruder detection systems.
Magos	Radar experts.
Marom Dolphin Ltd	Tactical textile for the military and security sectors.
Mayotex-Philcar	Company of former senior IDF officers with combat experience, advanced technology solutions for vehicles.
MCTECH	Unique anti-drone solutions, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), tactical jammers, prison jammers, and electronic war systems.
Megiddo	Personal protection equipment, armoured vehicles, infrastructure, cyber and IT protection, security services and surveillance systems, equipment and robots.
Memtex	They claim to produce the smallest tactical video system in the world. Optimized for undercover surveillance, body use, tactical observation, mobile and rapid deployment missions.
Meprolight	Experts in electro-optics manufacturing systems for the Armed Forces infantry.
MER Group	Tactical and infrastructure communications solutions, intelligence, cybernetics, Big Data for national security.
Mifram Security	Produces defensive products such as control towers, tactical fences and control units, among others.
Mistral Group	Addresses strategic security needs in the fields of National Security, terrestrial tactical platforms, combat engineering for soldiers, navigation systems and omnivision systems.
MLM Protection	Established in 2002 by Mr. Sharon Botzer and Mr. Ofer Bar, both former senior officers of the Israel Security Agency (the Shin Bet). This company supplies integrated security and consulting services.
Mobilicom	Global provider of mission critical communications solutions, develops and provides unlimited private mobile network technology and solutions.

Company	System, technologies and services
Monitel	Telecommunications monitoring and probe-based applications.
M Pest	Control and command systems software.
MS Tech	Detection and diagnostics sensors.
Naim Tech	GPS and wireless tracking solutions.
Nemesysco	Unique voice analysis technology for security markets, capable of detecting emotions and assessing the veracity of vocal statements.
Netcom Malam Team	Emergency situation management support, analyses all data to automatically provide information and action recommendations to decision makers.
Netline Communications Technologies	Develops, manufactures and sells electronic countermeasures. It searches, tracks and intercepts mobile phones and emergency communications.
NIRTAL	Security consulting and services, combat training and equipment for government companies and private sector companies, including: security and military forces, anti-terrorism and border guards. NIRTAL employs elite military, police, and intelligence personnel and point out they have experience of real combat situations.
Nowforce	Cloud-based personal security applications, mobile response tools and communications.
NVISOL	Security systems tactical needs.
OCTOPUS	Security management software with a smartphone app that allows organizations to manage all their cybersecurity and logistics requirements from one place.
Opgal	Infrared thermal imaging systems and advanced vision and surveillance solutions.
Optronics	Design and manufacture of night vision devices, electrooptic and production test equipment.
Orad	Implementation of border protection systems, military bases, defence agencies, secure cities, airports, sea ports, railway terminals and penitentiary facilities, among others.
Ortech	Protective materials for public, private and military locations, structures and sites.
OSG	Glass systems for automotive and architecture as well as for heavy railway engineering machinery and transparent armour for the military and civilian sectors.
OUTLOCKS	Secure fastening systems for access control.
Ozem	Sale of HLS and defence products to Brazil, mainly to national agencies belonging to the army and the police.
Phantom Technologies	Custom interference systems for FDU special forces, prison authorities, elite units, VIP protection, local authorities, etc. Mobile phone blockers, communications interceptors, power amplifiers/antennas and counter-surveillance equipment.
Phoenicia Flat Glass Industries	High-end security solutions for armoured vehicles and buildings. Phoenicia is an authorised supplier of NATO forces' vehicles.
Phoenicia Shield	Windows and façades resistant to fire, explosions and forced entry.
PICSIX	Counter-interception equipment designed to detect, locate and sabotage interception systems active in the vicinity.
PIKO	PIKO pepper spray gun (faster and more effective than pepper spray cans).
Plasan	Tactical manned armoured vehicles, known for their 4x4 manoeuvrability. Vehicles are equipped with intelligence, surveillance, recognition, command and communication technologies.
Pro4tech	Real-time analysis of outdoor video in adverse conditions, providing information on camera status.
Protrack	Computerized vision technologies and software and content analysis for the military and civilian markets.
Qognify	Video management, data analysis. Capture, integrate, correlate and analyse data from multiple security systems and operating systems.
RADA Electronic Industries	Electronic defence systems specialized in the development, production and sale of advanced electronic systems for air and land applications.
RADWIN	Wireless mobility and mobile broadband, voice, video and data for long range use
RAFAEL Advanced Defense Systems	Manufactures advanced defence systems for the Israel Defense, including naval systems, space systems and cybernetics.
Rb-Doors	Multi-bolt locking systems.
Rbtec	Designs and manufactures outer perimeter detection technologies.
Reporty	Real-time video-based mobile platform supported by a system that allows you to provide live and immediate video reports on location.
Infrared-ID	Infrared identification for night and thermal vision devices.
RT LTA Systems	Tactical system comprising a mobile control station and sophisticated sensor suite.

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Company	System, technologies and services
SESP	Protection of VIP convoys and military convoys, riot interference and anti-drone solutions, protecting crowds against improvised explosive devices, portable tactical and vehicle jamming, prison jamming, unmanned terrestrial vehicles.
SAN	Designs, manufactures, sells and provides machinery services along with technical equipment using light materials. Supplier for the Israel Defense Forces in this field.
Sdema Grup	HLS project management, including critical infrastructure protection, cybersecurity, aviation and transport protection.
SECUBIT	Gun shot counter system that allows you to register and store firing data in real time. It defines itself as a "black box" for weapons.
SEGURO Cyber Industries	Encrypted telephone system and interface that allows you to record incoming and outgoing calls for intelligence services.
SensoGuard	Buried and magnetic security devices, provider for the Israel Defense Forces
Septier Communication Limited	Interception systems and communications analysis, mobile localization infrastructure, anti-fraud applications and network surveillance products.
Seraphim Optronics	Electrooptic systems for covert surveillance in the military, paramilitary and civilian defence markets. Used for gaps and remote locations on borders.
SerVision	Remote video surveillance of any site, stationary or moving.
Shafran	Security systems for organisations, including information security and technical security systems.
SHILAT Optronics	Electrooptics company that provides several technologies for defence and national security applications, including micro tactical aerostat observation system, night vision cameras and lasers. Company owned by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems
Sightec	Computer vision using drones for real-time surveillance and inspection.
SILVER SHADOW	Firearms manufacturer and authorised supplier of the Israeli Ministry of Defense and police. The Corner Shot invented by Amos Golan is a field-proven system of tactical weapons.
SPARTA	Undercover and open operations for the government, corporate and private sectors. Consulting and risk assessment services. The company comprises former executives and operatives of the Israeli police, special forces, elite units, espionage and security agencies.
STI	Security solutions for paramilitary and police forces.
Sunshield Group	Protection of buildings, physical barriers, and risk assessment and analysis.
SuperCom	Biometry and smart cards
Shiryonit Hosem	Security doors, risk management and assessment and security fences.
SURF	Real-time video surveillance, video analysis, surveillance drones.
SDS (Suspect Detection Systems)	Automated research and control technologies to detect "hostile elements" and "suspects" at border crossings or checkpoints. Production of biometric technology.
Synel	Development and production of data systems of biometric technologies, fingerprints and wireless communication.
Synergy Global Project Management	Execution of security systems including border barriers and biometric data control.
Tactical Robotics	Subsidiary owned by Urban Aeronautics Ltd, developed the AirMule, an unmanned monomotor for places where helicopters cannot operate.
TANDU Technologies and Security Systems	Assessment of threats and vulnerability, definition of needs and operational requirements, security systems engineering.
TAR Ideal Concepts	Employees with extensive military history and security and intelligence experience. Provides military, police and special forces with technologies, equipment and tailored protective clothing.
Tech360	Electronic systems development.
Telemessage	Communications.
Terrogence	Anti-terrorist intelligence.
Thermal Beacon	Produces thermal emitters, optics, illuminators and laser pointers.
Top I vision	Tactical surveillance systems to detect, gather, process and analyse in real time.
Troya	Night vision and thermal images.
TSG	Subsidiary of Ness specializing in defence and national security telecommunications solutions as well as cybersecurity services.
Vidisco	Portable X-ray inspection systems.
VIISIGHTS	Video analysis solutions for cities, companies, infrastructure, among others.
Viki-Sense	Biometric and reconnaissance technologies. Created in 2012 by Israeli security force veterans.

Company	System, technologies and services
VisionMap	Aerial images for HLS defence.
Wave Guard Technologies	Mobile based detection and monitoring. Allows authorities to monitor individuals' and groups' real-time location and history, movements and communication activity, and to identify behavioural patterns.
Windward	Continuous assessment of the "risks" in national waters, signalling where and when more operational attention is required.
X-TEST	It is the security division of the Tamar Group, dedicated to versight, training and planning for security projects.
YTS	Design, engineering and integration of vehicles for special missions so that they are fully adapted to the tactical and strategic requirements.
ZAE	Production of unmanned and robotic systems, security planning and consulting, risk assessment, analysis and training.
3DOR	Dynamic 3D simulations for operations research.

Source: Own work based on the Israel Export Institute (2022)

meter detection systems along the 200 km border (Cision PrNewswire, 2019). The company's activity increased when Donald Trump was elected president in 2016, following his promises to extend the current wall, (Reed, 2016b).

■ **Colombia:** the Colombian army recently acquired a control system for its Venezuelan border from Israeli company Elbit Systems in a deal worth $30 million. The agreement was signed towards the end of 2021 and includes high resolution cameras, heat sensors and drones, as well as advanced command posts, tower building, control systems and personnel training (Infodefensa, 2021b).

■ **India:** has several walls along its borders. India uses surveillance technology and radars fitted with Israeli technology, including improvements to border fencing, terrestrial sensors and portable thermal cameras on its border with Pakistan and in the disputed region of Kashmir. Defence collaboration between the two countries has been remarkable for decades and increased significantly after the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 and with President Modi's arrival to power, which has made India one of the main buyers of Israeli technology (Sultaana, 2021). In fact, as Sultaana affirms (2021: 144-148), Israeli border surveillance technology has played a key role in the conflict between India and Pakistan, due to the use of border drones and sensors. Moreover, police deployed along the Kashmir border have also largely been trained at the Israeli Police Academy. In late 2021, India received Heron drones developed by Israel Aerospace Industry (IAI), which will be used on the disputed border, between China and India, in Ladakh. Heron drones can be used to fire ammunition (EurAsian Times Desk, 2021).

■ **Greece:** border technology partnerships between Greece and Israel have included Heron drones ma-

nufactured by Israel Aerospace Industry, through an agreement signed between the two countries in 2020. Greece uses this type of drone to control its maritime borders in the Aegean Sea in particular (Kogan, 2021). India uses the same drone to monitor its border with China and Frontex (European Border and Coast Guard Agency) uses them to monitor the Mediterranean (Ahmed and Tondo, 2021). They are manufactured in collaboration with Airbus Defense and Space Airborne Solutions (ADAS), a subsidiary of AIRBUS Defense and Space (Airbus, 2020).

■ **European Union and Frontex:** Frontex uses Heron and Hermes drones to survey the Mediterranean. They were produced with funds this European agency granted to two Israeli companies: Israel Aerospace Industry and Elbit Systems, at a cost of €100 million. The Israeli army has used both drones in Gaza (Ahmed and Tondo, 2021). The system accompanying the drones can send real-time information to Frontex control stations, which are shared with other coastguards, including the Libyan service (Monroy, 2021).

■ **Cyprus:** in 2021, Cyprus, where the North is divided from the South by a fence, purchased Israeli technology from Elbit Systems for surveillance in the area. These systems broadcast 24 hours a day, partly to control the flow of Syrian refugees arriving on the island (Al-Monitor, 2021; Ferreira, 2021).

■ **Kenya:** in 2015, Kenya announced that it planned to build a wall along its border with Somalia, mainly for reasons related to armed group Al-Shabaab and people trying to cross the border. In 2017, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu visited Kenya, and promised to provide technical support along this border. Israeli company Magal had built the fence (Garvin, 2018; Zeveloff, 2016).

■ **Morocco:** Morocco also uses the Hermes 900 drone built by Elbit Systems to control, carry out surveillance and fire ammunition at the wall separating the area of the Western Sahara it occupies (Helou, 2021).

■ **South Korea**: South Korea has been using Israeli military and security technology for ten years (Army Technology, 2011). This notably involves drones, as Israeli manufactured and designed Searcher II and Heron drones are used for various surveillance missions, including of the land and sea borders with North Korea (Saballa, 2011).

5. CONCLUSIONS: PROVEN INJUSTICE REPRODUCED

Israel has produced, reproduced and suffered armed conflict for decades. It now argues that this experience provides added commercial value. It has also built a brand, especially around *Homeland Security*, the sector that straddles the traditional internal security associated with the police, and the traditional international security associated with the armed forces. In Israel, these bodies overlap with other security and defence organisations.

Selling arms components to Israel is bad, given that its armed forces' use of weapons is well known. Israel does not respect international law, or International Humanitarian Law, or the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Statements by international institutions of all kinds are so numerous that it seems superfluous to specify the proven facts here. Buying military material from Israel is also bad, because it reduces the cost of its occupation of Palestinian territories, making such actions viable. Purchasing products that claim Israeli added value because they are "combat" or "field" proven, incentivises such practices and subordinates any objections. Doing business with Israeli military and security companies contributes to all the above, by facilitating their access to international markets, highlighting the added value of violence against the Palestinian population, importing and promoting the Israeli *security* model, and conditioning success on the highly questionable model practiced

in the Occupied Palestinian Territories and elsewhere. Irrespective of the dictates of economic liberalism, the markets or international relations, all this is bad.

In Spain, like other EU countries, the details of the statistics and material exported to Israel are known. Such exports are significant in terms of their failure to comply with Spanish and European legislation. This paper does not describe these exports as illegal because this conclusion has not been reached by a Spanish court – such exports are protected by the Official Secrets Act, which denies access to the information that would allow such a conviction–. However, we can say that they are totally contrary to the spirit and logic of the existence of a law against the arms trade, which is in force in Spain and in Europe, yet lacks the guarantees provided by the courts. It is relevant and significant that these exports take place with complete impunity and a lack of accountability. Furthermore, very few export licences to Israel have been turned down by Spain or other European countries. In spite of all this, exports of Spanish arms to Israel are not the most worrying element of the military and arms relations between the countries. Israel does not need Spanish weapons. However, it does need its collaboration, complicity and synergies to help export its own products and *Made in Israel* services in order to globalise a model that demonstrably harms people. A model that, in Israel, is based on *apartheid*.

Official details of the statistics and material imported by Spain from Israel are not known because, unlike

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exports, these are not subject to specific legislation. This situation is similar in many other countries, where explanations of purchases from Israel are dependent on media reports or publications in military reviews, rather than being the subject of an official report accounting for government actions. In the case of Israel and Spain, imports into Spain are known to be far higher than exports (as is generally the case across the board). These transfers are controversial too, because they lower the high cost of Israel's territorial occupations. And they also take place in a context that defends the added value of Israeli products having been used in "combat" situations, notably in the Gaza Strip.

There are at least four underlying reasons for the business relations between Spain and Israel: the creation of subsidiaries of Israeli companies in Spain (no examples of the reverse situation are known) to gain access to key national contracts; working together to win tenders to supply finished products to Spain's armed forces; long-term strategic cooperation for by-products or equipment components; and collusion in securing access to international markets. The central objective of these industrial relations is access to the Spanish or third markets, notably Latin America and the Arab world, where some Spanish business connections provide added value. Israel also benefits from participation in industrial programmes related to NATO and the EU, while Spanish companies can promote themselves through the Israel brand, consolidated through its experience of arms and security, especially in the Gaza Strip.

Lastly, the Israeli *security* model is quintessentially related to border and people control. All Israel's borders have walls, and many of the border walls built around the world are constructed by the same Israeli people and companies. Institutions all over the world have found that Israel doesn't know how to draw a security boundary. Nevertheless, its model is the one promoted and exported globally. Building walls has a serious impact on everyday life. In Palestine, walls separate families, communities and farmland; they limit access to hospitals and other services; and restrict the mobility of workers, companies and businesses. Israel's walls have shown how wall-building produces indiscriminate violence, and should not serve as a benchmark for any country. They should be resoundingly condemned.

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
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