

# THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN ROTA. A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS WORLD MILITARISATION



JUSTÍCIA I PAU

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REPORT

no. 10



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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

In October 2011 the Spanish government announced that Spain would take part in the project of a US and NATO missile defence system through the installation of the system's sea-based component in the base of Rota.

The project will be implemented through the Aegis BMD defence system, which is part of the global Ballistic Missile Defence System (BMDS). The Aegis BMD is the ship-based BMDS component.

These ships won't only be part of the missile defence system; they will also be involved in NATO's sea missions and in fast-response support missions to the US military AFRICOM and CETCOM commandos.

The positive economic impact that the Spanish government forecasts for the area is not very realistic. Should this really produce jobs and income, they would be very unstable and would depend entirely on US interests.

The location of the missile defence system will have negative consequences:

- It will cause a revitalisation of the arms race.
- Spain will become a military objective.
- Russia considers it as a threat and does not rule out the possibility of abandoning the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty START (which involves nuclear weapons) and taking measures to destroy the system.
- The support to NATO and US operations will mean further Spanish complicity with the US military strategy.

**Keywords:** missile defence system, Rota naval base, militarisation, arms race, NATO, US



# THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN ROTA. A FURTHER STEP TOWARDS WORLD MILITARISATION

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**What are the real interests behind the implementation of the missile defence system?**

## 1. INTRODUCTION

The Spanish prime minister, the US defence secretary and the NATO secretary general announced on the 5<sup>th</sup> of October 2011 that the ship-based component of the US missile defence system will be situated in the Rota naval base from October 2013, stating that this will benefit the Spanish populace.

Given the optimism shown at the event we think that it is necessary to take a closer look at the missile defence system to see what lies behind the alleged benefits announced by the government and to show the negative consequences it will have on Rota, Spain, Europe and the world.

The report begins with a description of the NATO missile defence project for Europe and of the system and its components. It then continues to answer a key question: who is really benefited from the implementation of the missile defence system in Europe and, more specifically, in Rota? Or: what are the real interests behind this project? Afterwards it focuses on different aspects of the missile defence system in Spain such as its placement in Rota, the legal and political aspects of the decision and the economic consequences for the region and the whole country. Finally, it analyses the dangers and effects of the installation of part of the missile defence system in the Rota base and of the implementation of the global missile defence system project for the West.

## 2. THE MISSILE DEFENCE PROJECT IN EUROPE

The Bush Administration designed the missile defence project in Europe in 2007. It was planned that The Czech Republic would host some radars and Poland a launch site. The Czech Parliament refused the installation of radars in March 2009. At the same time Russia declared its discomfort at the placement of missiles in Poland, very close to its borders. This political situation and the tremendously high cost of the project obliged the US Administration to abandon the project and to prepare a new one.

For this reason the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, and the Military Advisory Board recommended that president Obama review the former plan. Following these recommendations Obama approved on the 17<sup>th</sup> of September 2009 the beginning of the European Phased Adaptative Approach (EPAA), the new project for a four-phase<sup>1</sup> missile defence system in Europe, due to the perceived threat of missiles launched by Iran.

At the time the US intelligence calculated that Iran was manufacturing short and mid-range missiles faster than was initially estimated, while its potential capability of launching intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) was slower than previously assumed.

According to the US government, in the short term the Iranian missiles

1. The White House (2009); *A "Phased, Adaptative Approach" for Missile Defence in Europe*. Fact Sheet, September 17, 2009.

**Figure 1. Iranian missiles' range**



Source: Based on page 5 of the report *Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report*. Department of Defence, February 2010

**The European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPA) is due to the perceived threat of missiles launched by Iran**

**Iran is not considered a short-term threat for US territory and population**

**Table 1. Types of missiles**

<p><b>By distance from the objective</b></p> <p><i>Strategic missile:</i> designed to strike enemy's infrastructures placed far from the battle field.</p> <p><i>Tactical missile:</i> designed to strike the enemy on the battle field.</p> <p><b>By range</b></p> <p><i>Short-range:</i> less than 1,000 km</p> <p><i>Mid-range:</i> between 1,000 km and 5,000 km</p> <p><i>Long-range (or intercontinental):</i> more than 5,000 km</p> <p><b>By flight control system</b></p> <p><i>Ballistic missiles:</i> unchangeable trajectory</p> <p><i>Cruise missiles:</i> changeable trajectory during the flight</p>	
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Source: prepared by the authors

threaten its allies in the Middle East and Europe, US military and civil personnel (including their families) deployed in both regions and, though they are not explicitly mentioned, the US military bases located in the area. This means that Iran is not considered a short-term threat for US territory and population.

Iranian missiles Shabab-1, Shabab-2 and Shabab-3 have a range of less than 1,500 km. According to a report of the US Department of Defence, Iranian official statements suggest that the Shabab-3 Variant range might be 2,000 km and point out that they have the resources for a massive production of these missiles.<sup>2</sup> Besides, Iran is probably trying to enhance the accuracy of its short-range Shabab missiles. Figure 1 represents the range of all Iranian missiles.

The EPA project consists in the deployment of radars and missile interceptors in

Europe, both ground and sea-based.<sup>3</sup> The deployment began in 2011 and is to be progressively increased in the vulnerable area, in order for Europe to be protected by the defence missile system by 2018. The plan is to install components of the defence system both in the North and South of the continent, to ask NATO the specific options of the deployment and finally to integrate the EPA facility into the NATO members' missile defence systems.

The possible future integration has been warmly welcomed by NATO. There is consensus on the fact that the deployment of a US missile defence system in Europe has to be part of any future missile defence structure of the Atlantic Alliance. During the Prague summit in 2002 NATO commissioned a report to examine its defence options against missiles, as well as to study the territory and populations of its member states. The conclusion of the report – prepared by a multinational group of companies from both sides of the Atlantic – found that the missile defence system is technically viable and its conclusions were approved by the Riga summit in November 2006. During the Bucharest summit in April 2008 it was announced that the deployment of a US missile defence system in Europe will help to protect the allied states and will have to be part of the NATO system. It was agreed at the Lisbon summit in November 2010 to develop a missile defence capacity (against short and mid-range missiles, up to 3,000 km) for which EPA is considered to be a good contribution. Finally, in 2011 defence ministers of the Atlantic Alliance approved the NATO Ballistic Missile Defence Plan of Action with the objective of implementing the missile defence system during this decade.<sup>4</sup>

2. Department of Defence (2010). *Ballistic Missile Defence Review Report*. February 2010.

3. *The Phased Adaptive Approach for Missile Defence in Europe Fact Sheet*, MDA US Department of Defence, 17-9-2009, [www.mda.mil/system/paa.html](http://www.mda.mil/system/paa.html), Consulted on the 27th of October 2011.

4. NATO Public Diplomacy Division (2011); *Missile Defence Fact Sheet*, Press & Media Section, 21 June 2011.

The Spanish government's position is clearly expressed in the Spanish Security Strategy document for 2011, which states:

Spain approves the efforts to limit the proliferation of mid and long-range missiles which would allow the launch of weapons of mass destruction. The missile defence system has to be developed. [...] The participation of Spain in the NATO defence missile system programme represents a proper measure to support the efforts against the proliferation of launching systems for weapons of mass destruction. The proliferation of ballistic missiles poses a growing threat to the Alliance's member states, for which a collective defence capacity is needed. In order to extend the protection system to the population, the territory and the armed forces of all European member states of the Alliance, Spain will take part in this programme to extend the defence system beyond deployed troops and will be benefited from it.<sup>5</sup>

The EPAA project is going to be implemented through the Aegis BMD defence system, which is integrated into the BMDS global defence system. It consists of the following phases<sup>6</sup>:

- Phase 1 (timeframe 2011), which addresses regional ballistic missiles threats to the US European allies and US personnel deployed in Europe by deploying a ground-based radar and Aegis BMD-equipped ships. In March 2011 the US announced the deployment of the USS Monterey warship to the Mediterranean as the start of this phase.
- Phase 2 (timeframe 2015). A more advanced SM-3 interceptor will be

5. *Estrategia Española de Seguridad*, Gobierno de España. 2011. <http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/NR/rdonlyres/D0D9A8EB-17D0-45A5-ADFF-46-A8AF4C2931/0/EstrategiaEspanola-DeSeguridad.pdf> Last consultation on the 15th of November 2011.

6. Bureau of Arms Control, Verification and Compliance. U.S. Department of State. *United States European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) and NATO Missile Defence*. Fact Sheet, May 3, 2011.

deployed and a ground-based SM-3 ballistic missile defence interceptor site will be placed in Romania in order to expand the defended area against short and medium-range missile threats. The US and Romania made a joint announcement of its location in 2011.

- Phase 3 (timeframe 2018). A more advanced SM-3 interceptor will be deployed and second ground-based SM-3 site will be added in Poland to counter short and medium-range missile threats. Poland signed an agreement in June 2010 in which it agreed to host the facility. In April 2011 the Polish president signed the law that ratifies the agreement.
- Phase 4 (timeframe 2020). A new SM-3 version will be deployed to enhance the capacity to counter medium-range missiles and also possible future threats posed to the US by ICBM missiles from the Middle East.

The missile defence system is therefore going to expand through progressive extensions and interconnections to finally protect all US allies.

### 3. Technical aspects of the missile defence system

#### 3.1. The Ballistic Missile Defence System

The Ballistic Missile Defence System<sup>7</sup> (BMDS) consists of:

- A network of ground and sea-based sensors and radars to detect and follow the objective (attacking missiles)
- Intercepting ground and sea-based missiles to destroy the attacking ballistic missiles
- Management and control systems, and a communication network connecting sensors and intercepting missiles

The BMDS has a sea-based component (Aegis BMD) and a ground-component (GMD). There are two different ways of destroying the attacking missile: direct

7. *The Ballistic Missile Defence System*, Missile Defence Agency, US Department of Defence, [www.mda.mil/system/system.html](http://www.mda.mil/system/system.html), consulted on the 27<sup>th</sup> of October 2011.

**The EPAA project consists in the deployment of radars and missile interceptors in Europe, both ground and sea-based**

**During the Bucarest summit in April 2008 it was announced that the deployment of a US missile defence system in Europe will help to protect the allied states and will have to be part of the NATO system**

**The missile defence system is therefore going to expand through progressive extensions and interconnections to finally protect all US allies**

**Figure 2. SM-3 missiles launched by ships**



Source: Lockheed Martin website [www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/ms2/images/DDG11.jpg](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/data/assets/ms2/images/DDG11.jpg), consulted on the 28<sup>th</sup> of November 2011

**The BMDS has a sea-based component (Aegis BMD) and a ground-component (GMD)**

**The Aegis BMD system is designed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin**

impact (the *hit to kill* technology) and the explosion of the intercepting missile.

### **3.2. The Aegis Defence System**

The Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence<sup>8</sup> system (Aegis BMD) is the sea-based BMDS component designed and manufactured by Lockheed Martin. It includes the SPY-1 radar, the MK41 sea-based missile vertical launcher, the SM-3 interceptor (Standard Missile 3), manufactured by Raytheon, and finally the management and control system. The range of the SM-3 missile is 500 km.<sup>9</sup> Most of the Aegis BMD equipped US warships are Arleigh Burke<sup>10</sup> destroyers, designed and manufactured by Northrop Grumman.

The Aegis BMD component allows ships to use the *hit to kill* technology to intercept and destroy short and mid-range missiles. It also provides them with the technology to follow the intercontinental ballistic missiles being connected to other BMDS components and to intercept a missile during the middle and terminal phase of its endo-atmospheric trajectory (within the atmosphere).<sup>11</sup>

Currently there are more than 20 Aegis-equipped US Navy ships. The naval forces of Australia, Japan, Norway, South Korea and Spain also acquired it, although in some cases (such as the Spanish F-100 frigates) it is a different version from the one of the US warships.<sup>12</sup>

The Aegis system works as follows: in case of a ballistic missile threat, a ground or sea-based radar detects it and starts tracking it. The control system calculates the interceptor's trajectory and the point of collision with

8. *Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence*, MDA US Department of Defence, [www.mda.mil/system/aegis\\_bmd.html](http://www.mda.mil/system/aegis_bmd.html) consulted on the 27th of October 2011.


9. Directory of U.S. Military Rockets and Missiles. *Raytheon RIM-161 Standard SM-3*. [www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-161.html](http://www.designation-systems.net/dusrm/m-161.html) consulted on the 14th of November 2011.

10. González, M. and R. Martínez (2011); "EE UU desplegará en Rota 1.100 militares y cuatro buques del escudo antimisiles," *El País*, 5-10-2011.

11. *Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence, At Sea, On Patrol*. Lockheed Martin, 2010.

12. Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence. [www.lockheedmartin.com/ms2/aegis/abmd.html](http://www.lockheedmartin.com/ms2/aegis/abmd.html) Consulted on the 28th of October 2011.

**Figura 3. How the missile defence system works**



Source: prepared by Fundació Tam-Tam

the attacking missile. An interceptor is launched from a ship and the ship's communication system guides the missile to the interception location. The missile continuously receives updates from the ship in order to sharpen the intercepting trajectory. The impact spreads energy of over 130 MJ kinetic (equivalent to a truck charged with 100 tons at the speed of 120 mph).

According to the Missile Defence Agency<sup>13</sup>, between January 2002 and September 2011, 26 real tests were made launching interceptors from ships and 21 of them reached the objective. Yet,

13. *Aegis Ballistic Missile Testing*. Missile Defence Agency. Fact Sheet 09/2011.

the Federation of American Scientists<sup>14</sup> argues that those tests were not made under real-fight conditions. The Aegis system has not been tested in bad-weather conditions which can affect radar signal. Furthermore, the interceptors have not been tested during simulations against attacking missiles equipped with a decoy or other mech-

14. Butt, Yousaf and Theodore Postol (2011); *Upsetting the Reset: The Technical Basis for Russian Concern over NATO Missile Defence*. Federation of American Scientists Special Report. September 2011. [http://www.fas.org/pubs/\\_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defence%20Report.pdf](http://www.fas.org/pubs/_docs/2011%20Missile%20Defence%20Report.pdf), consulted on the 16th of January 2012.

**Figure 4. SM-3 Missiles range**



Source: prepared by the authors. Note: The two circles represent the range of SM-3 Missiles launched from the ships (the white points)

**Table 1. Budget devoted to the Aegis BMD by the Missile Defence Agency**

Year	Expenditure of the Missile Defence Agency for the Aegis-BMD
2011	2.255,7
2012	2.945,7
2013	3.337,2
2014	3.200,9
2015	3.654,7
2016	3.739,3

Source: Ronald O'Rourke (2011); *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress. April 19  
 Note: Numbers correspond to \$ million  
 Note: 2011 and 2012 is requested budget, the others are programmed budgets

**The Federation of American Scientists argues that tests were not made under real-fight conditions**

Regarding the EPAA some military observers are worried that the demand for Aegis BMD-equipped ships by regional military cadres may increase faster than the number of available ships.

15. O'Rourke, Ronald (2011); *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress. April 19, 2011.

This lack of balance will be seen over the next years prior to the placement of the two Aegis ground-based facilities in Europe.

**3.3. The Ground-based Midcourse Defence system**

The Ground-based Midcourse Defence (GMD) system<sup>16</sup> is the ground-based component of the BMDS designed to protect the US. It allows the interception and destruction of ballistic mid and long-range missiles in the mid-course part of their trajectory. Interceptors are located in Fort Greely, Alaska and Vandenberg Air Force Base, California. Controls are in Fort Greely and Colorado Springs. This system employs exoatmospheric interceptors with *hit to kill* technology.

**3.4. Connection with the Israeli missile defence system**

The US and Israeli governments are the most obsessed by the Iranian threat. Israel has developed its own missile defence system with a double goal: defence from Iran and Palestine. This defence system was begun in 1980 and was hastened in 1991 due to the Gulf War. It consists of two complementary systems: the Arrow and the Iron Dome. From the first one derived the Arrow-2, designed to intercept ballistic missiles. The Arrow-3, to intercept slow cruise missiles<sup>17</sup> has been developed since 2009. The Iron Dome is designed to destroy short-range projectiles launched from the Gaza Strip and southern Lebanon. The Arrow and Iron Dome systems are being developed with the participation of the US government and US military and security companies.

In June 2011 the chief of the Pentagon's Missile Defence Agency stated that the Israeli defence system will be included in a regional defence

16. Missile Defence Agency (2011); Fact Sheet, *Ground-based Midcourse Defence*, 07-2011, consulted on the 27th of October 2011.

17. Schneider, H. (2009); "Israel Finds Strength in Its Missile Defences", *The Washington Post*. September 19, 2009.

**Table 2 Forecasts of existing ships equipped with the Aegis-BMD and SM-3 missiles**

Year	Aegis BMD-equipped ships	SM-3 missiles
2009	18	63
2010	20	89
2011	23	111
2012	28	129
2013	32	155
2014	36	201
2015	38	263
2016	41	341
2017	42	428+
2018	43	500+
2019	43	513+
2020	43	515+

Source: Ronald O'Rourke (2011): *Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress*. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress. April 19

system designed by the US.<sup>18</sup> In this way the Israeli missiles will be able to protect US-allied Arab countries that Israel does not maintain diplomatic relations with and will strengthen US capacity to protect its troops in the Middle East.

#### **4. WHO IS BENEFITED BY THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM?**

Three important companies of the US defence sector are going to benefit the most from the implementation of the missile defence system: Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman. These companies have always been very well represented in two influential federal committees; the Defence Policy Board and the Defence Science Board, both of them advisers of the US Department of Defence on defence strategy, policies and programmes. Most members of these committees hold high-ranking positions in a number of defence companies. It is very common for the rec-

ommendations of these committees to be the solutions implemented by the government.

These three companies, together with Boeing, are actually those (of the defence sector) with most top-managers or lobbyists who previously held high governmental positions and vice-versa. It is the so-called "revolving door": the exchange of people holding top positions between the administration and the private sector. It is not coincidental that these firms are also the main winners of the US government's defence contracts. It would not be crazy to think that all of them may have been part of the group of companies that wrote the viability report of the missile defence system for NATO.

The following table shows data that highlight the revolving door phenomenon: top-governmental officers who join companies of the military industry complex and vice-versa.

As we previously explained, at each phase of the EPAA a new version of the SM-3 missile is going to be introduced, which means higher profits for the company that manufactures it, Raythe-

**The Missile Defence Agency stated that the Israeli defence system will be included in a regional defence system designed by the US**

**Three important companies of the US defence sector are going to benefit the most from the implementation of the missile defence system**

18. Pfeffer, A. (2011); "U.S.: Israeli missile defence system can protect our Mideast bases"; *Haaretz*. 20-06-2011.

**Table 3. Revolving door between firms manufacturing the missile defence system and the US administration**

High government's officers who became managers, executive board's members or lobbyists (between 1997 and 2004)*		Directing managers (2007, 2008 and 2009) who became high government's officers**	
Lockheed Martin	57	Lockheed Martin	5 (out of 10 directing managers)
Northrop Grumman	20	Northrop Grumman	-
Raytheon	23	Raytheon	3 (out of 12 directing managers)

Source: Prepared by the authors from Project On Government Oversight (POGO). [www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/government-corruption/the-politics-of-contracting/](http://www.pogo.org/pogo-files/reports/government-corruption/the-politics-of-contracting/), consulted on the 19<sup>th</sup> of July 2010 (\*) and the websites: [www.lockheedmartin.com](http://www.lockheedmartin.com), [www.northropgrumman.com](http://www.northropgrumman.com) and [www.raytheon.com](http://www.raytheon.com), consulted on 12<sup>th</sup> of March 2011. (\*\*)

**“Revolving door”: the exchange of people holding top positions between the administration and the private sector.**

**It would not be crazy to think that all of them may have been part of the group of companies that wrote the viability report of the missile defence system for NATO**

on. It seems quite suspicious that, after William Lynn<sup>19</sup> being named assistant to the secretary of defence in February 2009, (Lynn was Raytheon's vice-chairman and lobbyist until that time), the EPAA was approved in September 2009 and Raytheon's missiles department head, Taylor Lawrence<sup>20</sup> was made a member of the Defence Science Board in January 2010. It is worth highlighting that Lynn's appointment even required an exemption from a regulation of the Obama administration that aims to avoid former lobbyists working for the government in a jurisdiction of the same business sector in which they have worked in the last two years.

According to the governmental forecasts shown in Table 2, many ships will have to be manufactured and equipped with the Aegis system. So that Lockheed Martin, Raytheon and Northrop Grumman have ensured quite a good amount of orders for the coming years.

## 5. THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM IN SPAIN

### 5.1. Placement

Rota is going to be the base for the main sea-based component of NATO's missile defence system, hosting four US destroyers equipped with the Aegis BMD system and 1,100 US military personnel and 100 US civilian personnel. Ship mobility will allow the system to counter threats coming from different geographic locations. Two ships will be at sea, a third will perform surveillance at port and the fourth will be under repairs or maintenance.

According to the US Secretary of Defence, Leon Panetta<sup>21</sup>, these four destroyers won't only be part of the missile defence but will also take part in NATO's sea missions and in fast-response support missions to the US military commandos AFRICOM, which covers most of Africa, and CETCOM, which covers the whole Middle East. These four destroyers will have their permanent base in Rota.

19. Jaffe, Greg (2011); "William Lynn, Pentagon's No. 2 civilian, will leave post", *The Washington Post*, July 8, 2011.

20. RMS President Dr Taylor W. Lawrence Named to DoD Science Board, in [www.raytheon.com](http://www.raytheon.com) consulted on the 12th of March 2011.

21. González, Miguel (2011); "Rota, el escudo del sur", *El País*, 9-10-2011.

## 5.2. Political and legal aspects

In autumn 2011, the Spanish government explained that the localisation of the missile defence system in Rota is a great chance for the area. On the 5<sup>th</sup> of October Mr. Rodríguez Zapatero said:

Spain [...] will support and take part in an initiative that aims to increase the defence and protection of our citizens [...] this commitment is a guarantee for the defence of the Spanish territory and of the Spanish people [...] this initiative is going to have a very significant socio-economic impact.

Mr. Rodríguez Zapatero specified that the economic impact of the maintenance of the ships and the presence of the US personnel would be €50M a year and would help create some 1,000 direct and indirect jobs.<sup>22</sup>

Yet Spanish military officers are more direct. They speak openly and without misdirection. General Miguel Ángel Ballesteros, director of the Spanish Institute for Strategic Studies (IEEE) stated that the importance of this decision “cannot be measured based on the jobs it will create, though these are important” but mostly on the fact that “it is a clear political stake to turn Spain into a loyal and reliable partner for NATO and for the US.”<sup>23</sup>

It is worth noting that the Spanish government authorised the placement of the missile defence system in Rota without the consulting parliament on the Cooperation Agreement between

22. La Moncloa (2011); “El acuerdo de España con la OTAN para la base de Rota supondrá 1.000 nuevos empleos” Intervention by the President at NATO headquarters in Brussels. 5-10-2011. [http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Presidente/Actividades/ActividadesInternacionales/2011/051011\\_OTAN.htm.es](http://www.lamoncloa.gob.es/Presidente/Actividades/ActividadesInternacionales/2011/051011_OTAN.htm.es), consulted on the 12th of November 2011 and “Rota será sede naval del escudo antimisiles y acogerá a cuatro barcos de EEUU”, *La Vanguardia*, 5-10-2011.

23. González, Miguel (2011); “Rota, el escudo del sur”, *El País*, 9-10-2011.

Figure 5. Rota military base



Source: Prepared by the authors

Spain and the US.<sup>24</sup> This agreement determines the maximum number of military and civilian personnel that the US can deploy in Spain and its annex n. 2 specifies the activities that they can carry out in the base of Rota. This annex does not include the permanent installation of a missile defence system.

The installation of the missile defence system requires the modification of annex n. 2 and any change of the Agreement needs to be authorised by parliament.<sup>25</sup>

Furthermore the installation of the missile defence system clearly violates one of the conditions stipulated by the Spanish government in 1986 for the entrance of Spain into NATO. It says

24. Convenio entre el Reino de España y los Estados Unidos de América sobre cooperación para la Defensa. BOE, núm. 108, 6-5-1989.

25. We would like to thank Eduardo Melero for the análisis of the legal aspects of the missile defence system installation.

**Rota is going to be the base for the main sea-based component of NATO's missile defence system, hosting four US destroyers**

**The Spanish government explained that the localisation of the missile defence system in Rota is a great chance for the area**

**The Spanish government authorised the placement of the missile defence system in Rota without the consulting parliament on the Cooperation Agreement between Spain and the US**

**For the moment, works to adapt Rota port to NATO's needs is costing Spanish citizens €64M**

**The installation of the missile defence system in the base, it is going to become a key military objective**

literally: "The US military presence in Spain will be progressively reduced".<sup>26</sup>

### **5.3. Economic consequences**

#### **Costs for Spain**

There is scant information about the costs that the missile defence system is going to represent for Spain. In this sense, how is the defence system related to the recent extension of the port of Rota, when a new dock (n. 4) was built and opened in July 2011? And how is it related to the improvements made to docks number 1 and 2 and to number 3 in the near future? The government did not include these costs when it explained the benefits of the missile defence system. According to the minister of defence these reforms will allow an increase in capability of supporting NATO sea forces<sup>27</sup> within the agreements made with the Atlantic Alliance. Works will amount to €160M, 60% of which will be paid by NATO and 40% by Spain. As such, for the moment, works to adapt Rota port to NATO's needs is costing Spanish citizens €64M.

The Rota base also hosts the Spanish Navy General Headquarters. Due to the installation of the missile defence system in the base, it is going to become a key military objective, which could result in the decision to increase the security of the base, something that would imply an economic cost. This cost would be added to the Ministry of Defence's debt of over €30bn<sup>28</sup> which has almost bankrupted it.

#### **Creation of jobs?**

The one thousand jobs which, according to Mr. Rodríguez Zapatero, are supposed to be created thanks to the installation of the missile defence system in Rota will be divided into 60 permanent jobs, 100 temporary jobs and 772 indirect jobs, according to the vice-president Mr. Manuel Chavez.<sup>29</sup> Yet, if the €64M invested in the port's works had been devoted to the creation of jobs in any economic sector sustainable and adequate to the characteristics of the area, they would create truly stable jobs. This would be undoubtedly better than the 772 indirect jobs forecasted by the government and which, if they are actually created, will be totally subjected to the permanence of the US personnel in Rota. The year 1979 is a good example of this: after the departure of 31% of the US personnel from Rota 114 jobs were lost, which represented an economic collapse for the town at all levels.<sup>30</sup>

In fact, Rota does not have a very good record of stability concerning the maintenance of jobs, with a general tendency towards the loss of employment. The base employed 2,500 Spanish civilians until the late Eighties.<sup>31</sup> In 1997 the staff was reduced to 1,200 jobs.

The future of job stability looks even less favourable. In recent years the US government privatised many of the functions traditionally of the army, including defence and security functions, as well as all the logistics associated with a military base. So the US government is quite likely going to contract US private firms for all those services that are currently provided by the local civilian workers in the base of Rota. It is quite likely to

26. BOE núm. 33 Viernes 7 febrero 1986

27. Ministry of Defence. Press release. "El gobierno autorizará mañana construir cinco buques de acción marítima". [www.defensa.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa/2011/07/DGC\\_11](http://www.defensa.gob.es/gabinete/notasPrensa/2011/07/DGC_11) consulted on 17th of October 2011.

28. Navarro Gil, Enrique (2011); *La transformación de la política de Defensa en España*. Información, Defensa y Seguridad, IDS. Noviembre 2011.

29. González, Miguel (2011); "Rota, el escudo del sur", *El País*, 9-10-2011

30. Piñeiro Álvarez, M<sup>a</sup> del Rocío (2002); *Guerra y medio ambiente: una historia de la base aeronaval de Rota (desde 1953 hasta la actualidad)*. PHD Thesis, Universidad de Cádiz, p.477.

31. Román, F.J. (2004); "La base de Rota afronta una nueva reconversión", *El País*, edición Andalucía, 23-5-2004.

happen especially due to the strong links between the US government and the defence and security private sector (due to the phenomenon that we previously referred to as the “revolving door”). The privatisation of services could also affect indirect jobs. M<sup>a</sup> del Rocío Piñeiro states in her PHD Thesis that “jobs [...] became US subcontracts”<sup>32</sup> and that:

“...the loss of jobs shows again Rota base’s total dependence on the US military presence, as these workers can not be absorbed, given that the city does not have any industries to employ them. One of the main mistakes of the economic policy of Franco’s regime in this area was that it did not create any strategic industries that could spur the rest of the economic sectors, leaving Rota abandoned to dependence on the base.”

Later central governments have done nothing to change such a significant dependence.

### **What positive impact for the area?**

The government forecasted a €51M annual increase of economic activity in the area. €8.4M of this would correspond to the increase of employment among San Fernando’s shipyards for the maintenance and repair of the four ships of the missile defence system. Yet, for the reasons we previously highlighted, this maintenance and repairs are likely to be awarded to a US defence firm. Northrop Grumman, which manufactures these destroyers, is actually the one that provides maintenance in the US.

When the government talks about the positive socio-economic impact for the area in order to justify the installation of the missile defence system in Rota, it forgets the negative impact that it is also going to produce. Actually, over the years the base has caused damages to the local economy and population<sup>33</sup>, such as: sand accumulation in the basin of Rota’s fishing dock due to the change of sea flows caused by

32. Piñeiro; *ibidem*, p. 484.  
33. Piñeiro; *ibidem*, p. 470.

the military dock; bad communication with the neighbouring towns due to the need to pass over the areas of military jurisdiction; the negative influence of the military base’s presence on tourism; the high risk of accidents due to aircrafts’ low flights; the fact that the military base is located on the most fertile land of the area; the risk of accidents due to the military jurisdiction.

It is also noteworthy that the US residents’ consumption in the area’s market is only limited to the products they cannot find in the base because the base’s shops (supermarkets etc.) have much lower prices than those outside it.

Local economy has been excessively linked to the existence of the base. Over 50% of economic activity is related to it.<sup>34</sup> Although apparently this could be considered a socio-economic positive effect it is actually a big mistake to bind the area’s economy to such a volatile factor as the presence of the base. Should the US authorities decide to leave it, the region would collapse. Economic activity must be related to real and productive local economy.

### **The loss of local taxes**

The 1976 Spanish-American Friendship and Cooperation Treaty rules that US citizens are exempt from paying any kind of local or national tax. This exemption is still in force.<sup>35</sup> Since 1981 the local municipality has been asking that the US residents of the base pay the municipal taxes, such as the IBI, the one on economic activities, on mechanic traction vehicles or on work licences. For example, in 1993 the municipality lost out on over €343,000, corresponding to the circulation taxes that were not paid for the base residents’ vehicles. The number of these vehicles is higher than the number

34. Piñeiro; *ibidem*, p. 491  
35. According to Article 28 of the Protocol of amendment of the Cooperation Agreement for the defence between the United Kingdom, Spain and the United States of America. BOE, núm. 45 del 21 de febrero de 2003.

**According to Mr. Rodríguez Zapatero, are supposed to be created thanks to the installation of the missile defence system in Rota will be divided into 60 permanent jobs, 100 temporary jobs and 772 indirect jobs**

**Over the years the base has caused damages to the local economy and population**

**Since 1976, US citizens are exempt from paying any kind of local or national tax**

of vehicles registered to pay this tax, some years it even doubles it. Since the arrival of US citizens the town council has had to increase its services but it received no kind of compensation in return, due to their tax exemption.

The town is damaged by the local tax exemption, as it does not receive any compensation from the central government. The municipality presented a litigious-administrative appeal to the Supreme Court against the Spanish government to claim those taxes because of the loss of this income.

The local municipality estimates that it lost over €34M in taxes between 1984 and 1996, without including any interest in the estimate. Besides the above mentioned taxes, Rota municipality cannot charge for any licences for the commercial activities included within military jurisdiction that are not subject to military interests such as the restaurants, cinemas, shops etc.

The national High Court met the demand of the local municipality and invalidated the order decreed by the Ministry of Defence in 1992 which exempted the base's residents from paying the IBI tax for the commercial businesses (clubs, bars, cinemas etc) of the military area.<sup>36</sup> Moreover, in 2002 the Supreme Court recognised the right of the local municipality to charge taxes for the non-military work and activities, so that in 2005 the local municipality claimed €615,000 from the Ministry of Defence, as it is the institution responsible for the tax exemption in the bilateral treaty.<sup>37</sup>

According to the local municipality's estimates, by virtue of a 2001 sentence, the central administration should pay €1.3M for the IBI tax. It also claims €700,000 in taxes on vehicles and another amount for the civilian (non-military) works that were recently carried out within the

airport boundaries.<sup>38</sup> In addition to all that, Spanish military personnel living in the base pay the IBI tax to the local municipality of El Puerto de Santa María, while US military personnel do not.<sup>39</sup>

## **6. DANGERS AND CONSEQUENCES OF THE MISSILE DEFENCE SYSTEM**

### **Arms race**

The installation of a NATO and US missile defence system will cause countries they identify as *supposed* enemies to feel weakened in their offensive capacity. As a consequence these countries will try to improve the military technology to avoid the defence system or/and will manufacture more arms (the defence system is not infallible; a rise in offensive arms means higher chances of one of them overcoming it). A short term reaction could come from Iran and a long term one could come from Russia and China (when a planetary defence system is deployed). This will cause a rise in worldwide arms manufacture and military expenditure.

In return for its *protection* of Europe the US might also demand higher economic investments in the military sector of its European allies. As a matter of fact, all US secretaries of defence criticise European reluctance to increase military expenditure.

### **Spain becomes a military objective**

Due to the installation of the missile defence system the area is more likely to be attacked. As a consequence the whole Iberian Peninsula becomes less safe. The installation of the missile

36. Piñeiro; *ibidem*. p. 474.

37. Román, Francisco José (2005); "El resurgir de la base militar de Rota", *El País*, 24-4-2005.

38. Espinosa, Pedro (2011); "Defensa rechaza pagar impuestos al Ayuntamiento de Rota por la base", *El País*, 26-10-2011.

39. Ayuntamiento de Rota, Información Socioeconómica (2011); "Constantino Méndez, Secretario de Estado de Defensa, perdona el IBI de la Base a los americanos" 28-10-2011. <http://www.aytorota.es/icaro/showNews.php?id=1198&c=8> Consulted on the 15th of November 2011.

defence system in Rota makes Spain more important in NATO, and as a consequence a key military objective for potential US enemies, as NATO is clearly perceived as a military organisation led by the US. Furthermore the US leaves part of the supposed offensive threats to their territories to our country.

The military is fully aware of this consequence, so they try to minimise its importance by statements such as that of general Ballesteros, according to whom the defence system installation represents no significant change because “both the US and Spain are a permanent objective of international terrorism.”<sup>40</sup>

### **Unknown type of weapons hosted in Rota**

The base of Rota is being extended and it is becoming more important from a military point of view. This means it is reasonable to suppose that it may cause an increase in the circulation of arms, including nuclear arms. Indeed, under the agreement with the US armed forces, the Spanish government has to authorise US ships entrance without asking any information about the type of arms they have on board,<sup>41</sup> so that the Spanish government ignores whether they carry nuclear arms. Yet, this norm of the Agreement is contradictory to the second condition of the 1986<sup>42</sup> referendum on the entrance of Spain into NATO, which rules that “the installation, storage or introduction of nuclear

arms into the Spanish territory will be prohibited”.

It is also noteworthy that the US ships and submarines propelled by nuclear energy dock in Rota<sup>43</sup> and that Gibraltar is a frequent site for the provision of British and US submarines.<sup>44</sup> So if there was nuclear fuel or material leakage as a consequence of an accident or of an attack, Cadiz bay might become another Fukushima.

### **Impunity of the US militaries in Spanish territory**

The defence missile system will result in the arrival of 1,110 US militaries and 100 civilians to Rota. The cooperation and defence agreement between Spain and the US, signed in 1988 and modified by the amendment protocol of 2002<sup>45</sup> practically exempts the US personnel from any obligation to the Spanish legal system in the case of them being guilty of a crime (articles 40 and 44).<sup>46</sup>

Furthermore, the US has never ratified the Rome Statute, so US civilians and military personnel are not subject to the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. This means that US soldiers or officers can commit any crime and go unpunished.

### **Possible termination of the US-Russia bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty**

In spring 2010 Russia and the US signed START II, a bilateral treaty for the reduction of nuclear arms. One of the clauses allows any of the parties

**The installation of a NATO and US missile defence system will cause countries they identify as supposed enemies will try to improve the military technology to avoid or destroy the defence system**

**Due to the installation of the missile defence system the area is more likely to be attacked**

**It is reasonable to suppose that it may cause an increase in the circulation of arms, including nuclear arms**

40. González, Miguel (2011); “Rota, el escudo del sur”, *El País*, 9-10-2011.

41. Cooperation and Defence Agreement between Spain and the US. Annex 3 (Complementary norms about ships entrance into the port) norm 7. “Además, los buques estarán exentos de inspecciones, incluidas las de aduanas y sanidad” (norma 9.3 del Anejo 3). BOE, núm. 108, 6-5-1989.

42. For a good analysis of the Agreement see: M. Pérez González; “Análisis del Convenio entre el Reino de España y los Estados Unidos de América sobre cooperación para la defensa”, *Tiempo de Paz*, núm. 13, primavera 1989, p. 14-36.

43. Román, F.J. (2004); “La base de Rota afronta una nueva reconversión”, *El País*, edición Andalucía, 23-5-2004.

44. “El submarino nuclear “Florida” hace escala en el Peñón”, *Diario de Jerez*, 9-4-2011.

45. Amendment protocol of the cooperation and defence Agreement between Spain and the US. BOE, núm. 45 del 21 de febrero de 2003.

46. Cooperation and defence agreement between Spain and the US, 1st of December 1988, annexes and notes exchange, modified by the Amendment Protocol of the 10th of April 2002.

**The cooperation and defence agreement between Spain and the US practically exempts the US personnel from any obligation to the Spanish legal system in the case of them being guilty of a crime**

**Possible termination of the US-Russia bilateral nuclear arms reduction treaty**

**The Russian president also points out that should these measures not be sufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy mobile missiles to ensure the destruction of the European missile defence system**

**Russia holds the right to refuse further measures of disarmament and of arms control and to possibly terminate START**

to terminate the Treaty.<sup>47</sup> The Russian ministry of Foreign Affairs, Lavrov, stated that if the quantitative and qualitative increase of the US missile defence potential implied a significant decrease of Russian nuclear strategic strengths, Russia would terminate the Treaty.<sup>48</sup>

Although START II is not significant for the actual reduction of both countries' nuclear arsenals it represents an arms limitation mechanism. It also includes mutual inspections, which was not included by former treaties, through which arms limitation can actually be measured. As a result, should one of the parties terminate it, the conditions for the control and supervision would disappear and a new nuclear arms race could begin.

### **First Russian reactions to the system's implementation**

Russian president Medvedev's statements after the first steps for the implementation of the EPAA strengthen our suppositions.<sup>49</sup> In his words:

This plan particularly worries us [...] the US and other NATO partners are not taking our concern into account [...] a programme capable of weakening our contention capability [...] this European missile defence system is being implemented: it is being installed in Poland, Turkey, Romania and Spain.

Due to this, Medvedev decided to strengthen protection for the bases of strategic nuclear forces, to equip strategic ballistic missiles with systems to penetrate the missile defence system

47. Bohigas, Xavier (2011); "Crónica nuclear 2010, de la esperanza al desengaño"; *Mientras tanto*, 116. Segundo semestre 2011. p. 55-75.

48. Conference by Mr. Sergei Lavrov, Russian minister of Foreign Affairs de Asuntos Exteriores de Rusia, 6th of April 2010. Transcription on: [www.voltairenet.org/article164854.html](http://www.voltairenet.org/article164854.html) consulted on the 10th of July 2010.

49. *Medvédev's statement about NATO missile defence system in Europe*. [http://actualidad.rt.com/rusia/issue\\_32764.html](http://actualidad.rt.com/rusia/issue_32764.html), 23rd of November 2011, consulted on the 11<sup>th</sup> of December 2011.

and to implement measures to destroy the control and information systems of the missile defence in case of necessity.

The Russian president also points out that should these measures not be sufficient, the Russian Federation will deploy mobile missiles (among them the Iskander missiles in the Kaliningrad area) to ensure the destruction of the European missile defence system. He ends by saying that Russia holds the right to refuse further measures of disarmament and of arms control and to possibly terminate START. While speaking on the missile defence system the Russian minister for Foreign Affairs highlights that: "these actions cause distrust and spur the arms race in the Old Continent and outside it."<sup>50</sup>

So we are not discussing any imaginary dangers. The start of a new arms race is already at stake.

## **7. CONCLUSIONS**

The installation of the missile defence system will have a number of negative consequences for people in the area of Rota and the rest of Spain.

The most serious, which also affects the world population, is the arms race. This will cause a rise in world military expenditure which can only worsen the current situation of social economy weakening and social expenditure cuts.

According to politicians the missile defence system is justified by the need to protect us from missiles coming from Iran and North Korea. None of these countries currently has the capacity to launch a missile at Europe or the US. In our opinion, instead of installing a missile defence system there should be political and diplomatic relations to create a situation of mutual trust and respect. This is the way to build a

50. "Medvédev declara que Rusia puede renunciar al desarme por discrepancias sobre el DAM en Europa". *Rianovosti*, 23/11/2011, <http://sp.rian.ru/international/20111123/151701708.html>, consulte don the 1st of December 2011.

future that has no need of any defence systems. As we already demonstrated, the plan is for the missile defence system to reach the entire western world (and its interests) in its final phase. As the defence system is extended more and more, it will cause more countries to become suspicious.

The second negative consequence is the situation of direct danger to which the population of the bay of Cádiz (some 650,000 people) will be exposed. Should an enemy of NATO or the US attack, the citizens would be the first victims.

The fact that the ships equipped with the defence system will also have to support NATO and US operations in Africa and Asia is worrying too. These operations will be presented as initiatives necessary to protect the civilians or to export democracy, as in the cases of Libya, Iraq and Afghanistan. This will unquestionably increase the militarisation of the Mediterranean and Spain will be seen as an even closer ally of the US pro-war strategy.

We believe the Spanish government's assessments of the positive economic impact of the defence system not to be very realistic. Jobs will be very volatile and dependent on the decisions of the US authorities and will be directly or indirectly conditional to the support of war. The hosting of the missile defence system will require an increase of the base's security and modernisation costs but this money should be invested in the creation of stable employment and in the consolidation of a local productive and competitive economy, independent of the base.

The installation of the missile defence system will also violate two conditions of the 1986 referendum on the entrance of Spain into NATO.

International relations should be based on dialogue, respect and trust among the parties involved, not on military threats. Western obsession with *protection* can only result in an increase of mistrust and suspicion from other countries and, in the end, an increase in the arms race.

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